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The proliferation of uncoordinated governmental
agencies and policies have had dramatic and stifling effects
on U. S. strategic and critical materials industries and
thus have contributed significantly to current problems
of increased prices, lengthening leadtimes, and tenuous
availability of these materials. These effects have a
direct correlation to the same problems associated with the
acquisition of major weapon systems. Government and private
industry have been working to improve the situation, but
much more needs to be done. A national strategic and
critical materials policy must be adopted and implemented
by a singly responsible agency; inventory goals of the
National Defense Stockpile must be filled; and an investiga-
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There has been evolving over the past several years a
growing concern about the ability of the United States de-
fense industrial base to produce in a timely manner the
major weapon systems needed to maintain a strong defense
capability. One of the vital aspects of this ability is the
ready availability of strategic and critical raw materials
at reasonable prices.
It is the objective of this thesis to determine what
effects past, present, and proposed government policies,
regulations, laws, and agencies have on the availability
and price of strategic and critical materials and, conse-
quently, on the acquisition of major weapon systems. To
be addressed will be past and present government policies
and the current status of the various aspects related to
the strategic and critical materials industries in this
country. Through the simultaneous investigation of these
two areas an attempt will be made to satisfactorily answer
the central research question: "How do government policies
regarding strategic and critical materials affect the
acquisition of major weapon systems?"
Secondary research questions to be answered are:
1. How do strategic and critical materials impact
the manufacture of major weapon systems?

2. What is the current status of U. S. strategic
and critical materials reserves and production?
3. What are the current government policies regard-
ing strategic and critical materials?
4. How have government policies affected the stra-
tegic and critical materials industries?
5. What is being done to improve the strategic and
critical materials situation?
B. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this effort is limited to an investigation
of the effects that availability and price of strategic and
critical materials have on the acquisition of major weapon
systems. To be presented will be the current status of
U. S. reserves and production of these materials, government
policies regarding the materials, the involvement and ac-
tivities of private industry, and current initiatives and
recommendations directed at improving the strategic and
critical materials situation. There will be no attempt at
a technical explanation regarding the chemical nature of
strategic and critical materials nor at any description of
the workings of the related industries.
It is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with
the field of strategic and critical materials and of their




Primary research material was collected through a com-
prehensive search of the literature base for applicable
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studies and articles. Information was obtained from the
library of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense
Logistics Information Center, the Office of Legislative
Affairs CNavy Section), and various private corporations.
Secondary research material was collected via discus-
sions with government officials and members of private
companies involved with managing strategic and critical
materials.
Telephone and personal interviews with almost a dozen
private companies provided invaluable insight into the prob-
lems and initiatives currently affecting the industry.
Likewise, personal interviews with Mr. Paul Butler, Office
of Industrial Mobilization, Department of Commerce and the
following Federal Emergency Management Agency personnel
—
Mr. Paul Krueger, Director, Office of Plans and Preparedness;
Ms. Carmel Cassidy, Executive Assistant to the Director of
the Office of Plans and Preparedness; and Mr. Bob Mroczek,
Acting Chief, National Defense Stockpile Policy Division
—
provided valuable inside information regarding the problems
facing the government and rare insight into "why" certain
actions are taken.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II is intended to give the reader some back-
ground into what strategic and critical materials are and
how they are used in the production of major weapon systems.
11

Chapter III describes the current status of U. S. posi-
tion regarding strategic and critical materials and the
growing dependence on foreign sources of supply. The con-
cept of the National Defense Stockpile is introduced and
further elaborated. And, lastly, prevailing prices and
leadtimes are investigated.
The themes of Chapters IV and V are similar in that
they both are devoted to current policies, initiatives,
and recommendations regarding strategic and critical
materials—Chapter IV from the government perspective and
Chapter V from that of private industry.





A. STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS AS ELEMENTS OF THE
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
Over the past several years there has been much dis-
cussion about and many studies initiated on the United
States' deteriorating defense industrial base.
The report of the Defense Industrial Base Panel of the
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
Ninety-Sixth Congress entitled "The Ailing Defense In-
dustrial Base: Unready for Crisis" is indicative of this
nation's growing concern over this deterioration and the
consequent decrease in the capability to produce, in a
timely manner, the weapon systems necessary to maintain
the necessary level of defense.
One of the several specific areas of concern addressed
and found to be disturbing by members of the above panel
is that the shortage of strategic and critical materials,
combined with the resulting dependence on uncertain foreign
sources for these materials, is endangering the very
foundation of our defense capabilities. [5:1]
General Alton D. Slay, at that time Commander, Air
Force Systems Command, strongly reiterated the above finding
in his statement before the Industrial Preparedness Panel of
the House Armed Services Committee in November 1980. [28 : 111-18]
13

Said he: "...it is abundantly clear to me that
shortages of critical materials and our de-
pendence on foreign sources for many of them
are two of our most critical defense industrial
base problems. There are other financial,
productivity, and quality issues which I will
discuss in the balance of this statement. But
without an adequate and dependable resource base,
solutions to these problems will be of little
help in solving the total industrial base
problem.
"
B. WHAT ARE STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS?
1. Strategic and Critical Materials Defined
For purposes of this research, strategic and critical
materials will be defined as those designated as such in
the National Defense Stockpile Inventory published semi-
annually by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMAl
. [9: 14-1 8 J As can be discerned from Table 1,
Appendix A, there are presently ninety three (93) in-
dividual materials listed in the Inventory. Some of these
individual materials are consolidated into Family Groups.
This grouping results in a net total of sixty one (61)
individual materials and family groups. More information
regarding why some materials are listed in different forms
within family groups will be presented later in this thesis.
2. Who Determines Which Materials Are Designated
Strategic and Critical ?
The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling
Act of 1979 C50 U.S.C. 98 et. seq.) makes the President
of the United States responsible for determining "...from
14

time to time. . o which materials are strategic and critical
materials. .." [9: 21] By Executive Order 12155 of
10 September 1979, the President transferred the above
responsibility to the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. The Office of Plans and Preparedness
was established within FEI1A to carry out the mandate. [9 : 2]
The Office of Plans and Preparedness determines
which materials will be stockpiled and what inventory goal
level will be established for each based on an intricate
econometric model whose input information is received from
the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, and Commerce and
from historical consumption data from 109 U. S. industries.




As was stated previously and as is shown in Table 1,
Appendix A, there are 9 3 individual materials designated
as strategic. Throughout the remainder of this thesis,
statements will be made which generalize about all these
individual materials as a whole and how they as a single
entity affect the acquisition of major weapon systems.
However, because there will be instances in which specific,
individualized facts and figures will be necessary for
emphasis and explanation, three minerals have been selected
from the group to be representative of strategic materials




Each of these three was selected for different individual
reasons which will be reviewed later; but, in general, the
three were selected because they have been included in a
group of "five minerals that put together are the metal-
lurgical Achilles 1 heel of our civilization." [17:68] The
other two members of this group are manganese and the platinum
group metals. The selection of these three minerals is not
an endorsement that they are any more important or critical
than any other strategic minerals. The findings and recommen-
dations that will be presented in this thesis are applicable
to all the strategic materials and not just to chromium,
cobalt, and titanium.
1. Chromium
Chromium in economic quantities is produced from
its primary ore chromite. Although the United States has
some currently known chromite resources— in the Stillwater
Complex in Montana and in the beach sands of Oregon—because
mining it has been economically unjustifiable, there has
been no chromite mining conducted in this country since
1961. [11:297-299]
World resources total about 3 6 billion short tons
of shipping-grade chromite, sufficient to meet conceivable
world demand for centuries. Over 99% of these resources
are in southern Africa—nearly 2 5 billion short tons in the
Republic of South Africa and over 11 billion short tons in
16

Zimbabwe. [3:32] Annual United States consumption in 1980
was 1.04 million short tons.
Chromium is used for a variety of purposes such as
decorative trim for automobiles and other items and for use
in chemical processing equipment. But the one use most
crucial to defense systems is that of making stainless
steel.
The qualities of corrosion retardation and wear
resistance imparted to stainless steel through the use of
chromium make this common alloy essential to the production
of weapon systems.
Because of the significant cost increases and the
detrimental effects on performance associated with using
other minerals in place of chromium, there is, for all
practical purposes, no substitute for this critical mineral,
2. Cobalt
Cobalt is recovered as a byproduct of mining both
copper and nickel. The United States does have some cobalt
resources accessible to mining located in the Midwest and
the Far West. However, the low grade of these resources
makes mining them economically unfeasible. Domestic mine
production ceased in 1971.
Identified world resources of cobalt total about
6 million short tons of which the largest concentration of
the highest grade ore is in southern continental Africa in
the Katanga Province of Zaire. In addition to these
17

identified sources, the world's hypothetical and speculative
resources of cobalt contained in manganese nodules on the
deep sea floor (the typical nodule contains 0.3 percent
cobalt) and in lateritic iron-nickel deposits of tropical
regions amount to millions of additional tons. Annual United
States consumption in 1980 was 8,800 short tons. [3:36]
Cobalt is basically used in the production of super-
alloys. It imparts to these superalloys essential qualities
of heat resistance, noncorrosive high strength, wear resist-
ance, and superior magnetic properties. [7 : 10]
Modest rates of substitution of nickel for cobalt
can be achieved. As a general rule, however, significant
substitution of nickel for cobalt cannot occur without
compromising the performance or lifespan of the product.
Nickel does not approach cobalt in thermal shock resistance
or resistance to oxidation or corrosion. Chromium, manganese,
aluminum, iron, nickel, tungsten, and platinum can substitute,
at least partially, for cobalt magnets. However, as can be
seen from Table 1, Appendix A, with the exception of iron,
the United States is also extensively import dependent for
these materials. [7:15]
3. Titanium
To arrive at its end-use form, titanium undergoes
a two-step refinement process. First, titanium sponge,
a porous metal which is not useful in this form, is processed
18

from the raw minerals rutile and ilmenite. The titanium
sponge then undergoes a melting process which yields
titanium metal.
Rutile is mined from deposits of certain kinds of
sands. Although the yield of rutile is small, there are
ample world supplies of these sand deposits. Identified
world resources total about 28 million short tons of con-
tained rutile. Brazil accounts for the largest portion at
100 million short tons. Australia has 10 million short
tons and the United States 2 million. Annual United States
consumption'of rutile in 1980 was 250,000 short tons. [3:130]
Ilmenite is also mined from sand deposits. Because
of the low-grade yield qualities of ilmenite, once recovered,
98% of the mineral is used to produce titanium dioxide
which is used in the titanium pigment industry for purposes
other than producing titanium metal. There have now been
developed, however, processes which upgrade the ilmenite
to a form comparable to rutile. World resources of ilmenite
total about one billion short tons of which 54 million are
within the United States. Annual United States consumption
of ilmenite in 198 was 1.03 million short tons. [3:70]
According to figures compiled by Timet Inc. , one of
three major domestic titanium processors, the world contains
resources sufficient to supply titanium consumption for




Titanium metal is low in density, light in weight,
exceptionally strong, and resistant to many forms of
corrosion. Alloys have been developed which have the
strength of steel at 60% the density. These alloys can
be used at temperatures far exceeding 1,000 degrees Fahren-
heit. Because of this special property, titanium alloys
are the most engineeringly efficient materials of construc-
tion for critical parts of both defense and commercial air-
frames and the power plants used to propel them. Currently,
about two-thirds of all titanium mill product shipments
are allocated to the aerospace industry. [32:1-2]
For aircraft and space vehicles manufacturing uses
there is essentially no viable substitute for titanium
metal. For industrial uses high-nickel steel, and to a
limited extent, the superalloy metals may be substitut-
ed. [3:169]
D. HOW DO STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS AFFECT THE
ACQUISITION OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS?
A general starting point toward answering the above
question is an appreciation of the indispensable role
nonfuel minerals play in our society. There is not an aspect
of America's large diverse economy that is not dependent
upon nonfuel minerals. The technologic creativity that
has set this country apart from the rest of the world
20

has been its innovative use of nonfuel minerals and energy
to produce faster and better. Notwithstanding that
irrefutable fact, few Americans today realize that signifi-
cance—that all of what they do depends upon minerals—and that
without adequate and reasonably priced supplies, the economy
would grind to a halt. A modern defense capability depends
upon the certain availability of large quantities of special
metals and alloys. [32 :vii]
Nonfuel Cstrategic and critical) minerals are essential
to a strong defense capability due to their uses in virtu-
ally all defense equipment and supplies. The following
paragraphs will illustrate just how prolific and critical
are those uses.
1. Uses of Strategic and Critical Materials in Defense
Systems
Virtually every mineral and even some of the non-
mineral materials listed in Table 1, Appendix A, are used
in the manufacture of defense systems. Figure 1, which shows
the magnitude of the amounts of seven strategic minerals
used in the F-100 jet engine, is illustrative of these uses.
[33:79] The F-100 engine is currently used on the F-I5 and
F-16 Air -Force. Fighters.
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Although all the minerals used in defense systems
are equally essential, in keeping with the previously stated
policy of concentrating on chromium, cobalt, and titanium,
the remaining illustrations of uses will be restricted to
those three minerals.
2. Uses of Chromium
In addition to the use in jet engines illustrated
in Figure 1, chromium is critical to the manufacture of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise and tactical
missiles, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, and naval
surface ships and submarines. [9 : 9]
William J. Perry, former Undersecretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering, recently told Congress that
the proposed MX strategic intercontinental ballistic
missile system would require 2,500 tons of chromium to
build. [10:45]"
3. Uses of Cobalt
The amount of cobalt necessary to jet engine manufac-
ture as shown in Figure 1, is used to make superalloys which
are subjected to stress at high temperatures. These super-
alloys are used to make the turbine blades and discs, the
stator vanes, and the supercharger buckets and afterburners
on all the following military jet aircraft engines—F-100,




In addition to the applications on the engines,
cobalt is critical to other components of the aircraft
such as motors and generators, precision rotation equip-
ment, relays, transformers, fasteners, landing gear com-
ponents, high strength bolts, torque transmission trains,
propellant cases, engine hangar mounts, and tail sections.
In turn, the above engines and components directly affect
the manufacture of virtually every high-performance air-
craft in the U. S. defense arsenal, e.g. the F-18, the F-16,
and the F-15.
Cobalt is also critical to the manufacture of the
following military applications:
a. Helicopter engines, fasteners, flange bolts, and
structural components.
b. Missile components, cases, hardware, and springs
for Trident, Poseidon, Harpoon, and Dragon missiles.
c. Military tank and precision rotating components
and cannon recoil springs for the M-60 tank.
d. Armor piercing projectiles and parts.
e. Rocket engine cases and warheads.
f. Inertial navigation equipment.
g. Propulsion systems Cfossil and nuclear)
.
h. Missile control parts and cases. [7 : 12-15J
4. Uses of Titanium .
Currently, the most common military applications
for titanium, by far, are uses in jet engines, airframes,
24

and missiles. A small quantity is used in certain valves
and piping onboard submarines.
Presently there are studies being conducted on the
feasibility of using titanium in the construction of
submarine pressure hulls. Projections for the amount of
titanium required for each submarine hull and other com-
ponents range from 1,000 short tons to approximately
1230 short tons. [36:3-4]
In the same statement to Congress mentioned previously,
Mr. Perry reported that the MX missile system would require
150 short tons of titanium. [10:45j
E . SUMMARY
The growing number of investigations which have been
spawned by increasing concern over the deterioration of
the nation's defense industrial base have revealed as one
of the causes of this demise to be the shortages of adequate
supplies of strategic and critical materials.
Strategic and critical materials play an indispensable
role in our everyday lives and are absolutely essential
to the maintenance of a strong defense capability. Virtually
every strategic mineral—specifically chromium, cobalt, and
titanium— is critical to the manufacture of the United States'
strategic and tactical weapons systems.
25

III. STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL
MATERIALS CONCERNS
A. INTRODUCTION
As was stated in the previous chapter, production of
the United States' defense arsenal is dependent upon the
availability of strategic materials. This fact by itself
should generate no real cause for alarm because there are
ample world resources of these materials to satisfy world
demand for many years. In fact, the U. S. Bureau of Mines'
detailed supply and demand forecasts to the year 2 000 show
that world reserves of most mineral materials should be
adequate to meet world demands over the next two decades and
that for many minerals the United States itself is in a
favorable position. (21: 3]
The facts, however, that mineral production in the
United States has been decreasing over the past several
decades and that this nation is now, consequently, no
longer self-sufficient in this area and is growing more
dependent on foreign sources for critical materials are
reasons for people of this nation to become more concerned.
General Slay expressed his growing concern to the Defense
Industrial Base Panel in this way...
"There was a time when we produced more raw
materials than we consumed. Since 19 50, however,
our raw materials situation has deteriorated drastically.
We have now become dangerously vulnerable to the OPEC
26

type mineral cartels. The dangers of a high
dependence on foreign sources for any item
essential to our nation's survival can best be
illustrated by the OPEC oil cartel which caused:
price escalation, shortages, inflation, dollar
devaluation, trade deficits, and economic stagnation.
While oil is the best known and the most important
single commodity subject to possible cartel-type
actions, it is not the only one... Much of the
world's production and reserves of a number of
our critical materials are located in two areas
of the world: Siberia and Southern Africa.
"
[ 5: 25]
The cartel-type actions mentioned above have, in the
past, been invoked by other nations for economic reasons
—
to upgrade domestic standards of living and to enhance
world recognition. These economic cartels can have de-
vastating results on other world economies as previously
noted about OPEC. These effects remain, however, economic.
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the above effects,
what the people of the United States should be most seri-
ously concerned about are the political implications of
this nation's growing dependence on foreign minerals sources
and the opportunities this increasing vulnerability pre-
sents to our potential adversaries,
"The Soviet Union has been operating on parallel
tracks in its efforts to establish a position of
superiority over the Western alliance. One has been
the breakneck expansion of Russia's war machine.
Another has been the systematic effort to deprive the
West of automatic access to its sources of fuel and
cheap raw materials." [22:422]
The above excerpt is a description of Plan Azev. It came
from a fictitious novel entitled The Spike , and though there
Is no place in a thesis for speculation based on fictitious
27

supposition, the question is just how fictitious is the
foundation of information which spawned the passage.
The following passage forms part of that foundation:
"Our aim is to gain control of the two
great treasure houses on which the West de-
pends : The energy treasure house of the
Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house
of Central and South Africa." [28:111-7]
This quotation is not fictitious. It was uttered by
Leonid Breshnev to Siad Barre, President of Somalia, in
Prague in 1973.
Have the Soviets taken any steps since 1973 to accomplish
Mr, Breshnev' s aim? Regarding "the mineral treasure house
of Central and South Africa," it appears as if they have.
Significantly, they have been moving into Third World
projects to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of
Western mining consortia. In the past several years the
Russians have negotiated, either on their own or through
CMEA, the Eastern bloc Council of Mutual Economic Assistance,
27 technical-and economic-assistance agreements with Third
World countries that produce strategic minerals or have
deposits. The agreements vary, but in general they feature
large-scale Soviet technical aid for exploration and
development of new mines, with eventual payment in the form
of recovered minerals.
Meanwhile, the Russians and their allies are gaining
military footholds in places where they could one day cut
off Western access to strategic minerals. [18 : 44]
28

Looking at a map of Africa (Figure 2) it is apparent
that the countries containing vast reserves of strategic
minerals are precisely those in and around which Russian,
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FIGURE 2. . THE PERSIAN GULF OF MINERALS
The remainder of this chapter will focus on some specific
aspects of this serious situation.
B. UNITED STATES DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES
1. General
The United States economy gobbles up over $140 billion
worth, of metals per year. In 1978, imports were only $10
billion of that total, a 30 percent increase over the 1977
29

import total. [24:46] The 1979 import figure was $25 billion.
Even though a portion of these increases can be attributed
to world inflation, the ultimate result is that the United
States is becoming increasingly import dependent for its
minerals. One government study warns that by the year 2 000,
the U. S. mineral trade deficit will approach $100 billion
in current dollars
.
J24 : 4 6
J
The United States is more than 5 percent dependent
on foreign sources for over half of the 35 minerals shown
in Figure 3 which have been described as most essential
to our $2.3 trillion economy. {28:111-1]
Much of the world's production and reserves of a
number of these critical materials are located in two areas
of the world: Siberia and southern Africa. These two
areas contain 99 percent of the world's reserves of platinum
group metals; 80 percent of the world's manganese ore;
97 percent of the world's vanadium; 96 percent of the world's
chromium; 87 percent of the world's diamonds; 60 percent
of the world's vermiculite; and 50 percent of the world's
fluorspar, iron ore, asbestos, and uranium. Zaire and
Zambia now provide 65 percent of the world's cobalt. [28 : III-3]
The strategic implications for the United States
of these geographical concentrations of minerals are obvious.
The developing nations of southern Africa are economically
and politically unstable. The possibility of an unpredicted,
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FIGURE 3 U.S. NET IMPORT RELIANCE OF SELECTED MINERALS AND
METALS AS A PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION IN 1979
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is always present. The presence of Marxist regimes in
several of these nations, as shown in Figure 2, is also a
continuous threat to the supply pipeline to the West. And
if, for whatever reason, the African supply were severed,
the chief remaining source would be the Soviet Union.
2. Chromium, Cobalt, and Titanium
a. Chromium
U.S. Bureau of Mines statistics indicate that the
United States is 91 percent import dependent for chromium,
and the remaining 9 percent of supply comes from recycled
scrap, not domestic mineral supplies since the United States
currently produces no chromium. [3:32] It is interesting to
note that jet engine manufacturing needs for chromium cannot
be satisfied from commercial scrap because of purity re-
quirements. Therefore, for this vital use, the United
States is 100 percent import dependent for chromium.
Chromium is imported in two forms. In 1930,
990,000 short tons of chromite, which typically contains
22 percent to 38 percent chromium, were imported from the
Republic of South Africa C40%) , the Philippines (15%)
,
U.S.S.R (.16%) , Turkey 110%)., and other sources (19%). Also
last year 350,000 short tons of ferrochromium, which
typically contains 36 percent to 70 percent chromium, were
imported from the Republic of South Africa (62%) , Yugoslavia




Although there are several sources listed above,
it must be noted that together, Russia, Zimbabwe, and the
Republic of South Africa control more than 8 percent of
world chromium production. .[24:51]
Also of significance is the fact that for years
the Soviet Union has been a major supplier of chrome ore to
the West. Shipments, however, have dropped by 50 percent
beginning in 197 8.
There are, currently, conflictly opinions as to
the motive behind this action by the Russians. Some leading
American businessmen speculate that the Soviet Union has hit
on a new, immensely effective technique for crippling Western
industrial production by cutting off supplies of strategic
minerals. Others feel that depletion of identified Russian
reserves plus difficulties encountered in efforts to discover
new domestic sources have caused the Russians to cut back
on exports. J13:43-44J Whatever the reason, reduction of the
Russian source has made the acquisition of chromium more
difficult.
b. Cobalt
According to the U. S. Bureau of Mines, in 19 80,
the United States was 9 3 percent import-dependent for cobalt,
and the remaining 7 percent of supply came from recycled




In 19 80, 8,000 short tons of cobalt were imported
from Zaire 142%) , Belgium- Luxembourg (.16%) , Zambia (13%) ,
Finland (.6%) , and other sources 123%) . {3:36] It must be
noted that Belgium and Luxembourg have no domestic cobalt
mines. Their sources for raw cobalt are mainly Zaire and
Zambia.
Over the years, supply of cobalt has been highly
uncertain. During the Angolan civil war in 197 6, supplies
were interrupted when the rail line that carries cobalt from
the mines in Zaire, Zambia, and Botswana to the Angolan port
city of Lobito was cut. Major supplies of cobalt were again
severed in 1978 when rebel attacks in the Shaba Province,
the key cobalt mining region in Zaire, caused the mines to
close. [7:8-9] The political situation in southern Africa
is still highly volatile, and there remains only one rail
line on which to ship cobalt to the rest of the world.
Due to the high world market price of cobalt
brought about by the 197 8 shortage, the extensive, but low-
grade, concentrations of domestic cobalt are currently
being explored for possible economically feasible extraction,
c. Titanium
The United States imports both ilmenite and rutile-
the raw materials used to manufacture titanium products.
It also imports titanium sponge metal which, as mentioned
previously, is the result of the first manufacturing process
toward making titanium finished metal.
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In 1979, the United States was 100 percent import-
dependent for rutile. The. 19 80 figure was not released to
the public in order to avoid disclosing industry proprietary
data. It is known, however, that 235,000 short tons of the
mineral were imported by the United States from Australia
C84%1, India (_5%1 , and other sources (.11%) . [3:130]
Net import reliance data for titanium sponge
metal has never been released by the U. S. Bureau of nines,
again because of sensitive industry proprietary data. Imports
for 1980 amounted to 4,500 short tons which came from Japan
172%), U.S.S.R. C21%) , United Kingdom C6%) , and China (1%).
[3:168]
The difficulty facing the United States regarding
titanium is not that it is import dependent on unstable
sources. As can be seen from the statistics above, the
United States receives the large majority of its rutile from
Australia. The shortage in titanium occurs because there
is less than sufficient domestic capacity to process the
rutile into sponge. This fact forces the United States into
also importing foreign processed sponge.
As with chromium, the Soviet Union has recently
withdrawn from the titanium sponge supply market. This
loss of supply, which, as previously discussed, the United
States depended on for over one fifth of its imports of sponge,
greatly intensified the shortage of sponge in the domestic
market during 1979 and 1980. [16:57]
35

To ease the current shortfall in sponge pro-
ducing capacity and also to alleviate the import dependence
to some extent, the U. S. titanium industry is expanding
capacity. Predictions are that the shortage of titanium
will be overcome by the end of this year. [16:57]
There has also been developed a process by
which ilmenite can be upgraded to a quality equal to rutile
for making sponge. The United States possesses about 54 million
short tons of ilmenite, over 5 percent of the total world
reserves. According to industry officials, however, it would
take 4-5 years to bring on-line a plant to produce titanium
sponge from ilmenite. [16:59]
C. U. S. VERSUS U.S.S.R.
As can be seen from the above information, the United
States is sorely dependent on other nations for satisfaction
of its needs for strategic minerals. Because of the tech-
nological complexities of a modern society, it is hardly
possible that any nation can be self-sufficient in all minerals
required to totally support its economy. There is one nation,
however, which apparently has had the foresight to create
natural minerals and resource strategies to assure adequate
supplies. That nation is the Soviet Union. Today, the
U.S.S.R. is virtually self-sufficient for most of its minerals
needs. Russia is to some degree import-dependent for only five
minerals. These five are tin, bauxite/alumina, flourine,
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antimony f and tungsten. In only one of the five--bauxite/
alumina— are they more than 5 percent import dependent.
Additionally, the Soviet Union is a major producer and ex-
porter of platinum group metals, chromium, manganese, nickel,
and titanium ore. [28:111-4] As was mentioned earlier,
these exports, however, are no longer going to nations of
the West.
Simon D. Strauss, director and former vice chairman
of Asarco, Inc., a mining, smelting, and refining company,
summarized the contrasting U. S. and Soviet positions in
regard to minerals policies in the following manner: [31:53-54]
- The Soviet Union emphasizes mineral self-
sufficiency. The United States has taken
no steps toward improving its position in
self-sufficiency and seems to disregard this
as a matter of national priority.
- The Soviet Union restricts consumption of
minerals if necessary to avoid import de-
ficiencies. The United States as a consumer
economy places no limitations on consump-
tion other than to suggest the desirability
of increased recycling.
- The Soviet Union is a major exporter of min-
erals and uses mineral exports to obtain for-
eign currency. The United States imports of
minerals are steadily increasing. The net
effect of this has been to add to the pres-
sures weakening the U. S. dollar.
- Soviet policy in Africa strongly serves
Soviet commercial interests since turmoil
in Africa will strengthen the prices of
Soviet exports. U. S. policy in Africa is
dictated entirely by political considerations.
In fact, the Rhodes ian Zimbabwe) embargo has




While the Soviet Union expresses sentiments
of interest in the Third World, it has in
fact not materially assisted developing
countries in expansion of their mineral in-
dustries. The United States has made capital
available on favorable terms and has extended
trade concessions.
Exploitation of Soviet mineral deposits is
in no way inhibited by environmental con-
siderations. In the United States the pro-
liferation of environmental and safety regu-
lations puts a heavy burden of capital and
operating costs on the mineral industries.
In some instances these regulations are forcing
marginal producers to suspend operations.
Private groups are permitted, and indeed
encouraged by the government, to delay and
hinder mineral development through litigation.
D. NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE
lo History and Purpose of the Stockpile
The need to have some resources of certain com-
modities readily available in case of a crisis was recognized
as early as 1939. The Strategic Materials Act was passed
in June 1939. It provided for the purchase of only a very
few mineral commodities.
During World War II, the diversion of manpower and
shipping to procure strategic minerals and materials was
of such magnitude that, following the war, the Stockpiling
Act of 1946 was passed. This Act enlarged the number of
commodities covered by the 1939 law and provided for the
establishment of stockpiles to ensure supplies of essential
minerals in the event of a future war.
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The intensification of the cold war and the Korean
War resulted in passage of the Defense Production Act of
19 5Q. which, among other provisions, created a second stock-
pile—the Defense Production Act Inventory.
A third separate stockpile—the Supplemental Stock-
pile—was established in 1954 by the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act. Its purpose was to re-
ceive foreign minerals commodities bartered for U. S.
agricultural products
The above stockpiles were each originally maintained
by different agencies. Use of the commodities in each stock-
pile was governed by different regulations. And yet each
stockpile contained duplicates of commodities held by the
other two. [11:195]
These three separate stockpiles were eventually
combined into the National Defense Stockpile (hereafter to
be referred to as the Stockpile) by enactment of the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1979.
As stated in the Act, the purposes of the Stockpile
are CD to serve the interest of national defense only and
not to be used for economic or budgetary purposes, and
121 to provide stockpiled quantities of materials sufficient
to sustain the United States for a period of not less than
three years in the event of a national emergency. [9:21]
In addition to the formal purposes stated above, it
is intended that the Stockpile will reduce leadtimes and
3 9

demands on manpower, energy, production capacity, scarce
machinery, and transportation incident to mining and pro-
cessing that would otherwise create additional demands in a
war time environment. [5:29 J
The responsibilities for determining which com-
modities, and in what amounts, are held in the Stockpile
were passed by the President to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) by Executive Order 12155. The
Office of Plans and Preparedness was established within FEMA
to carry out these responsibilities. [9:i]
Executive Order 12155 delegated to the Administrator
of the General Services Administration the Stockpile
management functions of storage, inspection, maintenance,
security, acquisition, disposal, and market analyses. The
Federal Property Resources Service within GSA has been given
responsibility for these functions. [9:9]
Stockpile inventory goals are established periodi-
cally by the Office of National Defense Stockpile Policy
within the Office of Plans and Preparedness. An elaborate
econometric model is used to formulate these goals. The
model incorporates, among other factors, projected uses of
strategic materials during a national emergency as fore-
casted by the Department of Defense; a summation of separate
sets of estimated requirements for each sector of a three-
tier economy—defense, essential civilian, and general
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civilian; historical 12-20 year strategic materials con-
sumption data for 109 U. S. industries provided by the Com-
merce Department; supply information and import dependence
statistics from the Department of the Interior; political
reliability factoring of foreign supply sources which re-
flects the accessibility of those sources in time of emer-
gency obtained from the State Department; and special factors
such as an evaluation of domestic processing capacity for
a material to determine if the material should be stock-
piled in ore form or an upgraded, processed form. [12:2-10]
In addition to establishing stockpile goals, the
Office of Plans and Preparedness is responsible for coord-
inating any restructuring of the Stockpile through the
Annual Materials Plan. Each year an Annual Materials Plan
(AMP) is utilized to restructure, if necessary, the current
list of strategic and critical materials. The AMP is a
list of materials proposed for acquisition and disposal
developed through an interagency committee chaired by FEMA.
The agencies represented on the Annual Materials Plan
Steering Committee are the Departments of State, Treasury,
Defense, Interior, and Commerce, the General Services
Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget.
The Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce and
FEMA all chair subcommittees which investigate various
probable ramifications resulting from the restructuring of
the materials list. A more detailed examination of what
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aspects these subcommittees investigate will be presented
later in this thesis.
After the recommendations from the subcommittees
have been incorporated, the AMP is reviewed by all member
agencies. Upon inclusion of approved revisions, the Director
of FEMA submits the AMP to the National Security Council and
simultaneously provides a copy to the Office of Management
and Budget. Any further revisions are made jointly by the
National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget,
and FEMA. [9:3-4]
2. Status of the Stockpile
a. General
As shown in Appendix A, there are 93 strategic
materials (61 Family Groups) stockpiled in the National De-
fense Stockpile. Market value of these inventories is
approximately $14.9 billion. The commodities are stored at
116 different locations throughout the United States
- 34 military depots.
- 28 General Services Administration depots.
- 16 other government-owned sites.
- 10 leased commercial sites.
- 28 industrial plant sites.
These sites are as diverse as the William Langer Jewel Bearing
Plant, Rolla, North Dakota, where jewel bearings are stored,
and Citibank, New York, where industrial diamonds are stored.
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As shown in Figure 4, stockpiles of over 60
percent of the strategic materials do not meet established
goals. Over 37 percent, or 23 materials, are less than





Percent of goal filled
FIGURE 4
The Federal Emergency Management Agency reports
that $12.6 billion of purchases would be required to fill
the Stockpile goals. [9:2 ]
Quality of the materials stored in the Stock-
pile is also a concern. Much of the materials remaining
today was purchased for or transferred to the Stockpile
during the 1950 's shortly after enactment of the 1946
Stockpiling Act. [9:2] There has not been a major Stock-
pile purchase made since 1960. [28:111-14 ]
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The forms in which materials are kept in. the
Stockpile are also being questioned by both industry
personnel and government officials. Mr. Robin Brumwell,
Executive Vice President of Cabot Mineral Resources, a
leading producer of superalloys, states, "Form is as important
as quantity. There is little point in emphasizing chroraite
in a stockpile when the country's ability to convert to
ferrochrome is extremely limited." [2:3 ]
The Defense Industrial Base Panel believes that
as a matter of prudence, many materials need to be con-
verted from the ore state to the primary metal or alloy.
Through these conversions, energy is stored and the materials
are then readily available for use without further processing.
T5:29]
b. Chromium, Cobalt, and Titanium
Chromium is listed in the Stockpile, Appendix A,
as a Family Group. The summary line, "Chromium, Chemical and
Metallurgical Group," shows that chromium falls 179,770 short
tons shy of the established goal. The goal is almost 87
percent met.
The Stockpile inventory for cobalt is in excess
of 44 million pounds short of the 85 million pound goal. The
goal is less than 48 percent filled.
There are currently only 32,331 tons of titanium
sponge in the Stockpile. Of this total, 10,836 tons are
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considered not to be of stockpile grade. Therefore, the
goal of 195,000 tons has only been 11 percent attained.
E. .LEADTIMES AND PRICES FOR CHROMIUM, COBALT, AND TITANIUM
The primary research area of this thesis is the question
of how strategic materials affect the acquisition of major
weapons systems. This section will show how prices and lead-
times to acquire both the raw materials and the initial
products into which they are formed have increased dramatically
over the past several years. It will also be shown how these
increases have consequently caused equally dramatic exten-
sions in delivery times and rises in prices for major weapons
systems.
Increases in prices and increases in leadtimes each
causes its own unique problems. With limited money re-
sources available in the Department of Defense budget,
price increases result in the af fordability of fewer units
of the weapon system being bought or an equal number of units
of less costly, lower performance weapons. Increased lead-
times result in the weapon system entering the defense
arsenal at a later date than anticipated. In today's
high technology, rapidly changing defense arena, these delays
result in weapons, which are already obsolete in terms of the
threat they attempt to counter, being added to the arsenal.
The price of chromite ore rose over 50 percent in 1977
—
from $39 per metric ton to $59 per metric ton. Since that
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time, however, the price has stabilized and currently re-
mains at $55 per ton. [3:32]
Until 1978, the price of cobalt hovered around the
$4.0.0. - $7.00- per pound range. The shortage of cobalt in
1978 resulting from the rebel-caused disruption of supply
from Zaire pushed the price of cobalt up to an average of
$25.00 per pound. [7:4] The price on the spot market,
driven by a 7 0% allocation of supply to users, soared as
high as $50.00 per pound. [26:1] Even though supplies
have returned to normal and allocations have been lifted,
the price has remained at $25.00 in spite of the fact that
this arbitrary level far exceeds costs of production.
Since 1976, the price of titanium sponge has increased
from $2.70 per pound to $7.02 per pound—an increase of
160 percent. In 1980 alone the price increased by almost
77 percent. [3:168]
The above price increases, as well as increases in the
prices of other strategic materials such as nickel (65%)
,
columbite ore (250%), and tantalum ore (300%)
;
all con-
tribute to the soaring costs of major weapons systems. The
price rise in cobalt alone, for example, caused price
increases for the F-100 engine of almost $18,000; the J-79
engine, $21,000; and the TF-34 engine, $21,000. [28:111-15]
All the above engines are used on military aircraft.
The increase in leadtimes associated with strategic
materials is a somewhat more complex issue than that of the
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increases in prices. There are numerous reasons why lead-
times have increased. Two of the more important ones are
raw materials shortages and inadequate production capacity
resulting in large backlogs in specialty metals fabrication.
When all levels of manufacturing from acquiring raw
materials to processing finished metal to delivering
finished weapons are viewed as a whole, the titanium industry
exemplifies the leadtime problems associated with the
strategic metals industry in general.
As mentioned earlier, the supply of rutile is plentiful,
relatively secure, and presents no leadtime problem. Lack
of processing capacity for turning rutile into titanium
sponge is, however, creating increased leadtimes. In 1976,
average leadtime for sponge was 40 weeks. In 198 0, that
time had increased to 104 weeks. The second step in the
process—manufacturing forgings and extrusions— is an in-
dustry also fraught with insufficient capacity. Large
titanium forgings, which were delivered in 7 weeks in 197 8,
took 180 weeks in 1980. Delivery schedules for extrusions
during this same period increased from 65 weeks to 108 weeks.
Small, but absolutely critical items, such as titanium
bolts and fasteners underwent delivery time changes of 32 to
62 weeks and 25 to 58 weeks, respectively. [25:30-32]
The end result of the above increases is that components
used on major weapons systems, and thus the weapons systems
themselves, are delayed in entering the defense arsenal.
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From 1977 to 198 0, the delivery time for aircraft landing
gears, which are made from titanium, grew from 52 weeks to
12 weeJks. Delivery schedules for the F-100 engine have
increased from 19 to 41 months. [ 5: 13 J The TF-34 engine ,•
which was delivered in 1977 in an average 2 months, now
takes 39 months to be received. [25:32] Leadtime for the
F-15 aircraft has increased by 22 percent; F-16's by 50 per-
cent; and A-10's by 34 percent. [28:111-17]
Increasing emphasis on uses for strategic materials
outside the defense arena in such programs as improvement
of energy supplies and utilization, coal gasification, coal
liquefaction, magnetohydrodynamics, nuclear fission, and
nuclear fusion can be expected to put even greater demands
on all aspects of the strategic materials industries. [21:3-4]
These demands could very well press prices higher and lead-
times longer.
F . SUMMARY
There appear to be world reserves of strategic materials
sufficient to meet world consumption demands for many years
to come. Even though the United States possesses adequate
resources of many of these materials, they are not being
utilized. Consequently, the United States is becoming in-
creasingly import-dependent on foreign sources, of which
most of the major ones are located in the economically and
politically unstable area of southern Africa.
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Recognizing the importance of these strategic materials
and the potential catastrophic consequences of not having
adequate supplies in times of national emergency, the
Congress has passed several stockpiling acts whose purposes
were and are to maintain inventories sufficient to support
the defense arsenal should supplies be severed. Current
stockpile inventories fall short of the goals set and would
require purchases totalling $12.6 billion to attain them.
Prices and availability of vital minerals such as cobalt
and chromium are almost completely dependent on geopolitical
events in southern Africa. Sources for rutile, used to make
titanium, are plentiful and relatively secure. Lack of
fabrication capacity, however, has caused large price
increases and long leadtimes. Increasing interest in
titanium for uses outside the defense industrial base
portends of possible further leadtime and price growth.
The following chapter will present evidence which
indicates that governmental policies related to matters
affecting the strategic and critical materials industries




IV. GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING STRATEGIC AND
CRITICAL MATERIALS
A. INTRODUCTION
"Government has the responsibility for the
defense of the nation and therefore must be con-
cerned about supplies and availability of mineral
raw materials which in the modern age constitute the
power to make war. These are the metals to build
the machines of war, fuels to operate them, and a
host of non-metallic industrial minerals to construct
operational and training facilities and to feed
the chemical and metallurgical requirements of an
industry straining to support the war and the domestic
economy. Government has the responsibility for the
economic well-being of the country in peace and war."
[ 11:182]
Thus Peter Flawn, Director, Bureau of Economic Geology,
The University of Texas, expressed what fundamental precepts
should underscore a nation's minerals policy.
As will be substantiated by the following sections of
this chapter, the United States lacks an effective national
non-fuel minerals policy. There is very little, if any,
coordination of activities among the some twenty agencies
involved in implementing laws and regulations governing the
strategic and critical materials industries. In fact,
there is conflict and overlap of responsibilities present
among these agencies and also among the laws they implement.
On the positive side, it will be shown that various
government officials and agencies have initiated over the
past several years efforts to improve the U. S. strategic
and critical materials oosition and to move toward
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implementation of a non-fuel minerals policy which meets
Flawn's requirements and more.
B. GOVERNMENT STUDIES, LEGISLATION, AND POLICIES AFFECTING
STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS
There have been no less than 2 mineral or material
policy studies that have been prepared or commissioned by
one governmental agency or another, as well as others pre-
pared for groups outside government. [33:ix]
This section will present a chronology of these studies
plus all legislation pertaining to strategic and critical
materials.
The first national commission to examine the use of the
nation's natural resources was President Theodore Roosevelt's
National Conservation Commission of 1909, which devoted
most of its time to petroleum and high-grade iron ore. World
War I highlighted the criticality of certain minerals, other
than petroleum and iron ore, to the national defense and
prompted the War Department to publish its 1921 so-called
Harbord List of 28 minerals found to be in short supply
during the war.
Much debate was carried on between the two world wars
regarding wartime shortages, strategic stockpiles, and the
question of least-cost imports versus self-sufficiency;
but very little substantive legislation or study was con-
ducted until 1939 when the Bureau of Mines-Geological Survey
study listed 39 critical and strategic minerals. Subsequently,
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the original Strategic Minerals Act was passed in 1939 and
provided for the purchase of a few minerals. [ 33:8]
During World War II", the diversion of manpower and
shipping to procure strategic mineral materials was of
such, magnitude that following the war, the Strategic
Minerals Act was amended to become the Stockpiling Act of
1946 which directed the establishment of stockpiles to
insure supplies of essential minerals in case of a future
war. [ 11:195 ]
The intensification of the cold war between the East and
West and the Korean War prompted the passage of the Defense
Production Act of 1950 and also President Truman's appoint-
ment of the President's Materials Policy Commission, better
known as the Paley Commission after its chairman, William
S. Paley.
Title III of the Defense Production Act is the section
which had direct impact upon the strategic and critical
materials industry. Title III provided for the expansion
of productive capacity through loan guarantees and direct
government loans. The Act also provided for the encourage-
ment of exploration, development, and mining of minerals
and metals; for research and development of substitutes;
and for, in effect, the creation of a second stockpile
known as the DPA Inventory or Stockpile. [6:21871 The
above provisions were funded as necessary via a revolving
fund established specifically for the Act. In 1974, the
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revolving fund was abolished and a requirement established
that each program be submitted to the Congress for appro-
priation. Since 1974, very few programs have survived the
perils of political scrutiny by the Office of Management
and Budget and the Congress. [25:62 ]
The Paley Commission began its investigation just six
months after the United States entered the Korean Conflict.
The study took eighteen months to complete and produced a
five-volume report which is still considered a classic.
The Report recognized that no nation can be totally
self-sufficient. In reviewing the complexities of policy
issues, the members of the Commission arrived at the
conclusion that because many other national goals affect
the availability of minerals, it is not possible to spell
out in law definitive directions for those responsible for
policy implementation. Therefore, at the core of any minerals
policy must lie a national understanding of the importance
of minerals.
The Paley Commission made sixty-five recommendations.
The final two emphasized its strong conclusions regarding
government's responsibilities. First, the analytical
capability of the government must be strengthened, and
second, the dimensions of the issues require direction by a




As in 1950, 1954 produced both- a study report and legis-
lation pertaining to strategic materials. The "Report of
the President's Cabinet Committee on Minerals Policy"
strongly emphasized government's role in strengthening
domestic mineral productivity and the building of strategic
and critical stockpiles as a fundamental step toward national
security. [33:9-10 ] The Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act established a third stockpile-the
Supplemental Stockpile-to receive foreign mineral commodities
bartered for U. S. agricultural products. [11:195 ]
After fifteen years of legislative inaction, in 1970
Congress passed two laws affecting strategic materials-the
National Materials Policy Act and the Mining and Minerals
Policy Act.
The only consequence of the National Materials Policy
Act was the formation of the National Commission on
Materials Policy. The Commission's recognition of the
importance of domestic development and the role of the
private sector, the necessity for access to public lands,
and the need for improved technology was buried in its
one-sided enthusiasm for conservation and control because
of past environmental imbalances. [33:10 ]
When Congress enacted the Mining and Minerals Policy
Act of 19-70, after twelve years of effort, it adopted a
policy that was thought to provide a means of addressing
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not only the changes in reliability of foreign supplies but,
more importantly, to establish a national value of domestic
production. The Act is, on its face, simply a statement
of fundamental principles and objectives that was intended
to establish a set of Congressional priorities against
which the executive branch is to weigh other objectives
and proposed actions. [33: 14 J The responsibility for
carrying out the policy of the Act, which was to foster and
encourage private enterprise to improve the domestic mineral
industry, was given, by the Act, to the Secretary of the
Interior. [25]
On 12 December 1977, President Carter announced the
initiation of a cabinet-level Non-fuel Minerals Policy
Review in response to a February 1977 letter from 43 members
of the House of Representatives expressing deep concern
regarding the direction of government policies that were
adversely affecting the nation's production of non-fuel
minerals, the failure of the Department of the Interior to
implement the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, and
the need for a special minerals advisor in the Executive
Office of the President. The resulting cabinet-level Policy
Coordinating Committee was chaired by the Secretary of the
Interior and further composed of the Secretaries of Commerce,
State, Treasury, and Energy? Administrators of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and General Services Administration;
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Director of the National Science Foundation; Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs; Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors; Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations; Chairman of the Council of Environmental
Quality; Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
The Presidential directive which initiated the Committee
also outlined the "serious concerns" for study. They were:
"Whether the trends toward international inter-
dependence and the politicization of certain minerals
markets are increasing U. S. vulnerability to foreign
supply curtailments and price manipulations;
Whether U. S. reserves, production capacities, and
inventories are adequate to deal with possible supply/
price interruptions, or with the economic and social
consequences of such disruptions;
Whether land use decisions are based on adequate
minerals information and analysis;
Whether current tax laws favor the use of raw
minerals over recycled minerals or encourage sub-
stitution and other conservation practices;
Whether current government regulations adequately
protect the environment, health, and safety while not
unduly affecting the supply and price of minerals;
Whether minerals policies adversely affect U. S.
trade posture and balance of payments; and
Whether existing government policy analysis,
data analysis, and data collection functions are
adequate to support federal decisionmakers respon-
sible for formulating, implementing, and monitoring
nonfuel minerals policies." [33:23 ]
Upon submission of the Committee's final report, the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held
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hearings at which, none of the 42 witnesses who testified
considered the report adequate. The House Committee
reported, "The entire effort was a tragic waste that cost
American taxpayers about $3.5 million and the loss of some
13,000 person days. w [ 33 : 22-24 ]
In July 1979, the Stockpiling Act of 1946 was amended
and became the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling
Act of 1979. This Act was an attempt to improve the
management of government stockpiling activities. The
National Stockpile, the DPA Stockpile, and the Supplemental
Stockpile were consolidated into the National Defense Stock-
pile. It was emphasized that the purpose of the Stockpile
is to "serve the interest of national defense only and is
not to be used for economic or budgetary purposes." And,
the Act established in the Treasury a separate fund designated
the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund which would
receive all moneys generated from the sale of materials from
the Stockpile to be used only for the purchase of other
Stockpile materials. [9:21,24]
In 19 80, the Congress became distressed over the Depart-
ment of Interior's decade-long inactivity in developing a
national minerals policy as intended by the Mining and
Minerals Policy Act of 19 70. Consequently, it passed the
National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and
Development Act of 19 80. This Act directed that the President,
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through: the Executive Office of the President, coordinate
the activities of all agencies assigned responsibilities by
the Act. The Act assigned specific implementation respon-
sibilities to the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, and
the Interior; but it also stated that nothing in the Act
was to be interpreted as changing any provision of the Mining
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970. [ 23]
In addition to the legislation noted above, laws which
restrict and regulate the strategic materials industry are
also important when looking at the evolution of minerals
policy. Some laws and policies that have had significant
impact are the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, the Wilderness Act, the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act, the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act, the formation of the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and a foreign policy which imposes sanctions on major foreign
suppliers of strategic materials in the name of human rights.
There are some additional studies currently being con-
ducted and legislation pending in the areas of strategic
and critical materials. The above laws and studies, however,
are what currently form the nation's strategic and critical
materials policy.
1. Overlaps, Gaps, and Conflicts
An examination of the above studies and laws reveals
that there exist among them some policy conflicts, some over-
laps, and some gaps.
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Until two years ago when the National Defense Stock-
pile was formed, there were in existence three separate and
distinct stockpiles, each with its own set of operating
parameters and each containing materials also stockpiled by
the other two. Materials held in the DPA Stockpile could
have been used or disposed of under presidential authority
as long as they were not sold below the prevailing market
price. On the other hand, Congressional action was required
to release materials from the National Stockpile or the
Supplemental Stockpile unless the President invoked the
issues of national defense or obsolescence. [11:195 ] The
existence of three unique stockpiles caused confusion,
uncoordinated efforts, and inefficient operations.
Lack of a definitized national non-fuel minerals
policy has allowed conflict to arise between proponents of
conservation measures and legislation on one side and ad-
vocates of minerals exploration and development on the other.
The issue is not that each side is unflinchingly opposed to
the desires of the other, but that there is no agency or
appointed individual in a position to arbitrate the con-
flicts and balance the pros and cons of each constituency.
Consequently, each side continues to push for what it thinks
is right, and confrontations continue.
Another example of conflicts between two disparate
advocacy groups is that of the needs of the minerals industry
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versus U. S. foreign policy. Rep. Santini summarized the
disparity in the following way:
"Our foreign policy has not been in tune with
the reality that is shaping the nature of the United
States dependency or that of the free world. It
is imperative that foreign policy, therefore,
emphasize the legitimate economic interests of the
United States as a significant element of its
national security interests. We must have an
economic strategy for our relations with foreign
nations that will give higher priority to mineral
security aspects of those relations. We cannot
wait until we are irrevocably trapped. Our
foreign policy must work, to reestablish traditional
economic concepts under international law. [5:27]
A foreign policy "not in tune with the nature of
U. S. dependency" is clearly in evidence when sanctions and
embargoes are imposed, in the name of human rights, against
South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).— two countries vital
to supplies of many of our strategic and critical materials.
Even legislation covering strategic and critical
materials also appears overlapping and confused. The Mining
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 very definitely assigns full
responsibility for matters pertaining to strategic and
critical materials to the Secretary of the Interior. Al-
though Section 6 of the National Materials and Minerals
Policy, Research and Development Act of 198 specifically
states that nothing in the Act alters any requirements set
forth by the 197 Act, it did assign new responsibilities
to two other Cabinet-level departments—Commerce and De-
fense—and additional responsibilities to Interior. These
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new assignments have caused confusion as to which Department
is now supposed to have overall minerals-policy authority
and responsibility.
There is no question that legislation professing
conservation of resources and preservation of the environ-
ment is as equally important as that favoring minerals
exploration. Nor is there much difficulty recognizing the
value of human rights. What is needed, however, is a
statutory basis for balancing the values of these different
advocacies and for formulating them into a coordinated,
unified policy.
C. AGENCIES RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING STRATEGIC AND
CRITICAL MATERIALS
According to General Slay there are 2 different federal
agencies administering 80 different laws which directly or
indirectly affect the non-fuel minerals industry. [28:111-11]
The agencies that indirectly affect the industry are
those not involved with policy-setting decisions or day-
to-day operational decisions. This fact, however, does
not lessen the influence these agencies exert on decisions
and operations. For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency and Occupational Safety and Health Administration
through regulations and promulgations backed by statute very
definitely influence, and often dictate, what decisions will
be made by firms in the industry.
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Some examples of governmental offices with indirect ef-
fect of a lesser degree are (1) the Office of Science and
Technology Policy which is responsible for coordinating federal
materials research and development and related activities.
[ 23 :sect. 5 (b) ] and (2) the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency which is sponsoring materials substitution research. [ 26 : 4]
Focus will now shift to those agencies whose activities
directly affect matters related to strategic and critical
materials.
Pursuant to Executive Orders 10480 and 11490 under the De-
fense Production Act, and Executive Order 12155 under the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, the Department
of the Interior is responsible for emergency readiness plans
and programs for all non-fuel minerals. The Department of the
Interior is, in general, responsible for mines, concentrating
plants, and refineries, and for the ores, concentrates and
other materials treated in such facilities.
The Department of Commerce is responsible for facilities
and materials that are further along in the chain of process-
ing and utilization, and it maintains the Defense Materials
System to channel materials to defense and defense-related
production on defense rated orders.
The Department of the Interior has chartered the chartered
the Emergency Minerals Administration to carry out actual
operations in the event of a major emergency, and the Emergency
Minerals Administration is based upon the Bureau
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of Mines, with support as needed from the U. S.
Geological Survey and other Department of the Interior
units. In emergencies, the Department of the Interior
operates under the direction of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the independent agency created in 197 9
to consolidate the emergency planning functions of the
government.
The Bureau of Mines, within the Department of the In-
terior, continuously monitors domestic production, imports,
exports, stocks, and consumption of all major non-fuel
minerals. Detailed reports are received monthly, quarterly,
or annually from domestic mines, smelters, refineries,
recyclers, and major users. Monthly import and export data
are obtained from the U. S. Customs Service via the 3ureau
of the Census of the Department of Commerce. Bureau of
Mines experts also continuously monitor developments in
foreign supply areas. To facilitate coordinated government
action in the event of a national emergency, the Bureau
in 1975 organized nearly 100 interagency mineral commodity
committees. These committees include experts from the
Bureau of Mines, the U. 5. Geological Survey, and one or more
areas of State, Commerce, Defense, CIA, FEMA, GSA, Treasury,
U. S. Trade Representative, Council of Economic Advisors,
International Trade Commission, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Council of Wage and Price Stability, and for
certain commodities, Agriculture and Transportation. These
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committees would be promptly called upon in the event of
any emergency.
Under the auspices of the Export Administration Act of
1979 which authorizes the use of export controls to restrict
exports detrimental to U. S. national security, the Depart-
ment of Commerce is charged with monitoring exports and
contracts for exports of any nonagricultural commodity "when
the volume of such exports in relation to domestic supply
contributes, or may contribute, to an increase in domestic
prices or a domestic shortage, and such price increase or
shortage has, or may have, a serious adverse impact on the
economy or any sector thereof."
A worsening supply situation could generate the imposi-
tion of a system of priorities, under Title I of the Defense
Production Act, in which rated orders would have to be filled
first. If, however, priorities proved to be inadequate,
they would be followed by a system of allocations, also
authorized under Title I. The Bureau of Mines and Depart-
ment of Commerce would implement priorities and allocations
in their respective areas of responsibility.
A serious shortage situation could necessitate recourse
to the National Defense Stockpile as authorized in Section
3 of the Stockpiling Act. To release stockpiled materials,
FEMA, in consultation with other agencies, would prepare
a justification and recommendation for the President's
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signature. Upon receipt of the President's authorization,
the Office of Stockpile Disposal of GSA would release the
material to specified recipients.
In the event the above short-term measures cannot cope
with, a long-lasting supply disruption, long-term domestic
supply expansion programs could be sponsored and funded
utilizing Title III of the Defense Production Act. The
Bureau of Mines would recommend needed mineral supply ex-
pansion programs to FEMA, which would then direct GSA to
make the necessary contractual arrangements. [20:9-10j
The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act
of 1979 statutorily established the National Defense Stock-
pile. Executive Order 12155 assigned the Act's Section 3
responsibilities to FEMA and Section 6 management functions
to GSA.
Pursuant to Section 3 and the Executive Order, FEMA
established the National Defense Stockpile Policy Division,
within the Resource Preparedness Office, within the Office
of Plans and Preparedness to formulate and maintain policies
and goals relating to the Stockpile. The Stockpile Policy
Division receives support in these functions from the Office
of Industrial Mobilization, Department of Commerce.
Pursuant to the Executive Order the General Services
Administration assigned to its Federal Property Resources
Service the Section 6 activities of storage, inspection,
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maintenance, security, acquisition, disposal, and market
analysis associated with the stockpile program.
Presidential guidance to FEMA also includes a planning
process for restructuring the Stockpile through the Annual
Materials Plan (AMP I. This planning process is accomplished
through the Annual Materials Plan Steering Committee chaired
by FEMA. Other agencies represented on the Committee are
the Departments of Defense, Commerce, the Interior, State,
and Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency, GSA, and the
Office of Management and Budget. The Departments of Defense,
State, and Commerce also chair subcommittees which investigate
various aspects related to the Stockpile such as defense
requirements and the impact of Stockpile purchases and
disposals on foreign producers and the domestic market. [9:3]
Section 8 of the Stockpiling Act assigned responsibility
to the President for making scientific, technologic, and
economic investigations concerning the development, mining,
preparation, treatment, and utilization of domestic ores
and other mineral substances. The President passed this
task to the Department of the Interior via Executive Order
12155.
Notwithstanding the importance of the above agencies
and their respective activities, the overriding desire of
the Congress for more than the last decade has been to




The first attempt was the passage of the Mining and
Minerals Policy Act of 1970. According to the Act, "...
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government in
the national interest to foster and encourage private enter-
prise in..." basically building a strong, well-managed
domestic minerals industry through a comprehensive, well-
planned, coordinated policy. The responsibility to develop
the policy was assigned to the Secretary of the Interior. [ 19
J
In 1980, for reasons which will be enumerated later,
Congress passed a second law directed at developing a
national non-fuel minerals policy. The National Materials
and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980
assigned specific responsibilities to four other agencies
besides the Department of the Interior.
The President, through the Executive Office of the
President, is responsible for coordinating the activities
of all other responsible departments and agencies, and for
implementing a national non-fuel minerals policy. The
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy is
responsible, through the Federal Coordinating Council for
Science, Engineering, and Technology, for coordinating all
federal materials research and development and related
activities. The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with
FEMA, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of the CIA, and such other members of
the Cabinet as may be appropriate is responsible for
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initiating a case study on an industry affected by the
availability of strategic and critical materials. The
National 3ureau of Standards was tasked by Commerce to
carry out this responsibility. The Secretary of Defense
is to prepare a report to Congress assessing critical
materials needs related to national security and identifying
the steps necessary to meet those needs. And lastly, the
Secretary of the Interior is to initiate actions to enhance
the capabilities of the Bureau of Mines and to collect,
evaluate, and analyze information concerning mineral occurence,
production, and use from industry, academia, and other govern-
ment agencies.
Section 6 of the Act states very specifically that nothing
in the Act was to be interpreted as changing any provisions
and requirements of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of
1970. C 23] This section, therefore, reaffirms the respon-
sibility of the Secretary of the Interior to develop a
national non-fuel minerals policy.
Upon taking office, President Reagan appointed a Cabinet
Council on Natural Resources and the Environment. This
Council is looking at all aspects of the use of natural
resources verses environmental conservation. No results
have as yet been forthcoming, but there should be some
emerging in the near future.
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1. Overlaps , Gaps , and Conflicts
With the plethora of agencies cited above involved
in so many different activities associated with strategic
and critical materials, it is inevitable that confusion and
conflicts and overlaps will occur.
For example, under the Stockpiling Act via Executive
Order 12155, the Department of the Interior is made re-
sponsible for conducting research to better utilize domestic
reserves of minerals. And yet the R&D Act of 1980 assigns
overall responsibility for research and development to the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. And although FEMA
chairs the Annual Materials Plans Steering Committee, the
Agency has no statutory authority to arbitrate disputes
and conflicts of interest arising from the different per-
spectives of the members of the Committee.
The above overlaps and conflicts are basically
procedural in nature and could quite easily be remedied.
A basic conflict of interests, however, exists between the
group of regulatory agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency whose purpose for being is to conserve
and preserve the natural resources and environment, and
that group such as the Bureau of Mines whose charter is to
improve utilization of domestic minerals resources.
There is no reason to question the validity and
importance of each of these purposes. The conflicts be-
tween the two groups, however, result in serious consequences
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and derive from the one major gap in the area of agencies
responsibilities—there is no one agency discharging the
responsibility of coordinating and directing the various
activities of the numerous agencies. In Congress, for
instance, jurisdiction of interstate and foreign commerce,
public lands, mining, minerals r procurement laws, defense
production, research and development, and taxation is
divided among several committees. And within the Executive
Branch responsibility is divided among the Departments of
Defense, Commerce, the Interior, Treasury, Energy, State,
and various other agencies. [5:48]
The House of Representatives Committee on Banking
and Currency summed up the situation this way:
"The problem of scattered and overlapping
jurisdictions has increased both in the exec-
utive and legislative branches. Such fragmented
jurisdiction over the natural resource area max-
imizes bureaucratic competition and jealousy,
while at the same time inhibiting unified policy
formulation and implementation. Since natural
resource and commodity decisions involve domestic
economic and political considerations as well
as foreign economic and political policies, a
true national perspective must transcend the
interests of a particular agency. Still, each
agency's information and policy input tends to
be directed by a concern for its own clientele
rather than a broad consideration of the national
interest. "[33:28]
This lack of a "national perspective" has not developed
from lack of tasking. The intention of Congress in the
passage of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 197 was
to assign the Department of the Interior the responsibility
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for developing a national minerals policy and thus coordinat-
ing all activities associated with strategic and critical
materials.
According to Representative Santini's Subcommittee
on Mines and Mining, notwithstanding the clarity of the
statutory language of the Act and the fundamental purpose
of its accompanying legislative history, the Department
of the Interior has chosen, for a full decade, to abdicate
its assigned role and responsibility. It has regarded the
mining and minerals industry with a long history of benign
neglect. [33:16]
In defense of his Department, the Secretary of the
Interior under President Carter declared:
"The Act does not provide to the Secretary
of the Interior any authority or supervisory
responsibilities over other Federal Departments
as they exercise their authorities in carrying
out responsibilities which affect minerals
policy." [33:17]
There thus exists a fundamental disparity between
interpretations of the Act by the principals involved.
Over the past four years, the General Accounting
Office has investigated implementation of the 1970 Act
and has, among other aspects, stated that it is the "basic
responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior to identify
requirements for achieving a coherent national policy re-
garding non-fuel minerals." [33:20]
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According to conversations held by this researcher
with, the Office of Plans and Preparedness within FEMA and
with, the Office of Industrial Mobilization within the
Department of Commerce, the perceived abdication of re-
sponsibility by the Department of the Interior prompted the
passage of the National Materials and Minerals Policy,
R&D Act of 19 80. The intent was to spread responsibilities
among other agencies in hopes of generating new efforts
toward formulating a national policy.
These same conversations revealed that instead of
enhancing efforts toward developing a national policy,
passage of the Act has caused more confusion. The National
Bureau of Standards was tasked by the Department of Commerce
to coordinate and carry out its portion of the Act. When
questioned on who was in charge of formulating a national
non-fuel minerals policy during testimony before Senator
Harrison Schmitt's Subcommittee on Science, Technology,
and Space, the Director of the Bureau of Standards was
unable to respond. Secretary of the Interior Watt and
Secretary of Commerce Baldridge have both indicated that
their respective departments now have taken the initiative
to formulate a policy.
President Reagan has shown his apparent preference
on which agency should be in charge by placing Secretary Watt
as chairman of the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources
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and tha Environment. And in the opinion of Mr. Paul Krueger,
Director of the Office of Plans and Preparedness, Congress
will wait to see what evolves from this Council before
taking any further action.
D. CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE POLICY
In general, past management of the National Defense
Stockpile has been subjected to a great deal of criticism,
with the lion's share falling upon the General Services
Administration. GSA has in many cases, however, only been
an instrument used and abused by other governmental agencies.
One area severely censured has been use of the Stock-
pile, in conflict with the purpose as stated in the Stock-
piling Act of 1946, as a means to help balance the federal
budget. GSA correspondence shows that many of the sales
in the early to mid-1970 's were indeed conducted under
pressure from the White House and Congress in order to
balance the budget. These sales amounted to an average
rate of $700 million per year from 1970 to 1975, with a
peak of $2 billion in 1974. Other GSA documents suggest
that in 1971, the Office of Management and Budget had already
included revenue of $103.2 million in its next budget in
anticipation of the sale of surplus nickel. [ 34:Al]
The passage of the new Stockpiling Act of 197 9 was
thought to have ended the use of the Stockpile for budgetary
purposes. Section 3 states specifically that the Stockpile
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is to be used for purposes of national defense only and
Section 9 establishes the Transaction Fund whose funds,
generated from sales of stockpiled materials, can only be
used to purchase additional stockpile materials. What
appears solid on paper, however, sometimes proves to be full
of holes in operation. According to information obtained
from interviews with, personnel from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, funds brought into the Transaction Fund
through sales must be authorized and appropriated by Congress
for use within three fiscal years following the end of the
fiscal year in which they are received. If they are not
appropriated within this period, the funds are transferred
to miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury. Appropriation
must, like all other funds, come from Congress via the
President. Theoretically, therefore, Congress or the
President could use funds from the sale of strategic materials
to balance the budget by merely failing to authorize and
appropriate their use.
There is currently a resolution in the House of Repre-
sentatives which restricts the sale of strategic materials
to $5 00 million per year. The intent is to make the Trans-
action Fund a less lucrative source for balancing the
budget
.
The Government has also been cited for using its re-
sources in the Stockpile to influence the market of raw
materials. As an example, in November 19 65, the Government,
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in. a determined attempt to prevent aluminum and copper price
increases, threatened immediate and massive Stockpile sales
of these metals. [ 11:1990
But in general the most severe criticism has been directed
at the apparent mismanagement of the Stockpile and related
activities. Internal GSA auditors have charged that over
the last decade tens of millions of dollars have been lost
through the sales of surplus materials at below market prices.
In self-defense, GSA personnel who negotiated the sales
contracts said that without generous terms, the agency would
not have been able to sell surplus stocks at all. [34:A1]
An illustration of management at its worst is that used
regarding the cobalt stockpile. At one time the stockpile
contained 102 million pounds, but decisions to reduce the
goal caused a substantial share to be declared excess.
As a consequence, 60 million pounds were sold between
1964 and 1975. At that time no problem existed regarding
cobalt production or world supplies. Yet, these stockpile
sales doubtless contributed to holding down cobalt prices,
thus annoying the government of Zaire--the world's major
producer—and discouraging potential producers of by-
product cobalt from investing in projects to recover the
metal. In 1976, when the government substantially increased
the stockpile goal to 85.4 million pounds, stockpile sales
stopped, but by then the inventory was down 40.8 million
pounds. With the invasion of Zaire in 1978, the market
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tightened and prices skyrocketed. However, at that time
the Stockpile was no longer in a position to sell. Today,
the United States has a stockpile which is 4 8 percent of
its goal, and a dependency on southern Africa for 7 6 per-
cent of its requirements, and cobalt priced at $25 per
pound. Although criticism based on hindsight is always easy,
it would appear that the United States must share a large
part of the responsibility for cobalt's present chaotic
market conditions.
The current Republican Administration appears to have
a much more keen interest, than did the last, in the status
of the Stockpile. This interest was manifested early in
this new administration by President Reagan's announcement
in March 1981 of authorization and appropriation to buy
$100 million worth of strategic materials—the first major
buy since 1961.
This renewed enthusiasm will hopefully reverberate
throughout the agencies involved with the Stockpile and
generate a clear-cut purpose for its use.
E. GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From the preceding sections of this chapter it would
seem that the government is wallowing in a quagmire of
shortsightedness and mismanagement regarding strategic and
critical materials. While there are definitely some
difficulties to overcome, the government is by no means
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lacking for activity in this area. The following paragraphs
will prove that much tine and effort, especially in the
recent past, have been expended in an introspective look at
current laws, policies, and regulations. This self-investi-
gation has resulted in initiatives directed at improving
the situation and recommendations on what further needs to
be done.
1. Initiatives to Improve Government Actions and Policies
Representative Santini has remarked that "...with
the exception of the Paley Commission in the 19 50' s under
President Truman, (the members of government) have not taken
a good look at our minerals policy." [14:53]
Up until just a couple of years ago, that statement
was true. Since 1979, however, an increasing number of
investigations into policies and regulations affecting
strategic and critical materials have been conducted. The
following is a brief synopsis of some of the major ones.
As Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Science,
Technology, and Space, Senator Harrison Schmitt (New Mexico)
held hearings and concluded that, "Recent U. S. foreign
policy has created a chain of events which, if they pro-
ceed unchecked, will result in direct or indirect Soviet
control of these sources of supply." He outlined a six-
point program calling for development of mineral reserves
in this country and focusing foreign policy more sharply
on national goals. [14:51]
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Throughout the 96th Congress, the nines and Mining
Subcommittee chaired by Rep. Santini (Nevada) conducted a
lengthy and detailed inquiry into the availability of
essential minerals. The resultant report stressed that
many problems exist, from inefficient utilization of public
lands for minerals exploration to antiquated antitrust
laws, and made several recommendations for improvement—some
of which will be detailed later in this section. Rep. Santini
stressed that although the problems are many and diverse,
they funnel down to one conclusion—the United States is
promoting its dependence upon foreign sources at the very
time the security of many of those sources is becoming less
certain. [33:vii]
The Defense Industrial Base Panel of the Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives also conducted
hearings during the Ninety-Sixth Congress. The Defense
Industrial Base Panel was formed as a direct result of the
disturbing findings of the 1980 Summer Defense Science
Board on Industrial Responsiveness, appointed by the Under-
secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Although
the Panel's charter was to investigate the larger area of
the defense industrial base, it did include an inquiry into
the area of strategic and critical materials. Its conclusion—
a shortage of critical materials, combined with a resulting
dependence on uncertain foreign sources, is endangering the
very foundation of our defense capabilities. [5:1]
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Upon his entering office, President Reagan demon-
strated his concern in this area by appointing the Cabinet
Council on Natural Resources and the Environment which is
to look, at the strategic materials national policy, or lack
thereof. Also under his direction, the National Security
Council is investigating the effects of a cobalt shortfall.
In addition to the above rhetoric being exchanged
and the reports being generated, initiatives in other areas
are also being undertaken.
Research and development efforts in several different
areas have been quite prevalent. Most of the efforts are
being conducted under sponsorship by FEMA and the Department
of the Interior through the Bureau of Mines; however, other
agencies are also involved.
The Departments of the Interior, Commerce, and De-
fense and FEMA are jointly sponsoring various National
Academy of Sciences studies on strategic minerals. One
study is evaluating the advantages of upgrading stockpiled
materials to shorten emergency production leadtimes. The
study focuses on balancing the need for versatility of
application allowed by stockpiling as raw ore versus the
desirability of shorter production leadtimes resulting from
holding upgraded forms. Other studies are developing methods
for assessing substitutability of non-fuel materials. [9:4]
Research in the Bureau of Mines includes development
of new mining and processing technology, recycling methods,
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and improved materials for better performance. Under study
are several methods for recovering chromium, nickel, and
cobalt from laterite deposits and also from flue dusts,
plating wastes, and other residues. Special emphasis is
being placed on methods affecting chromium. To help de-
velop recovery techniques for scrap, a pilot plant has been
designed to treat superalloy scrap containing chromium as
well as other critical materials. Other conservation
approaches include surface chemistry research using ion
implantation. This method would produce a corrosion and
wear-resistant layer having properties of a high-chromium
alloy, while the bulk of the material would contain little
chromium. [9:5] [21:2]
The U. S. Geological Survey conducts a broad-ranging
non-fuel mineral exploration program to assess new domestic
sources of mineral raw materials. The "Stillwater Complex"
in southwestern Montana is currently being studied. This
complex has greater potential for the production of platinum
and chromium than any other place in the conterminous
United States. The complex also has potential for develop
ment of copper, cobalt, and nickel. [9:6J -r
Bureau of Mines scientists are evaluating rare-
earth cobalt magnets in which 2 percent of the cobalt has
been replaced by a mixture of copper, iron, and magnesium.
Permanent magnets represent one of the largest uses of
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cobalt, accounting for about 2 percent of total U. S.
consumption. r9:7]
As a hedge against possible shortages and cost
escalations, the Department of Defense is preparing a sub-
stitute materials R&D program. Possible substitute options
have been identified for beryllium, titanium, cobalt, and
chromium.
The only feasible substitutes for beryllium may be
metal-matrix composite materials which DOD estimates will
require five years and approximately $34 million to develop.
Although graphite-epoxy and graph!te-polymide com-
posites can be substituted in some structural applications
of titanium, the most realistic group of substitutes is
again from the metal-matrix composites family. Fiber-
reinforced titanium composites substituted for the bulk
metal result in savings of titanium metal and improved
specific stiffness. Savings of titanium are estimated at
50 percent.
Basic research and development programs are evaluat-
ing a discontinuous ly reinforced titanium composite material.
When high surface temperatures for short durations are
found as in advanced tactical missile structures, a 90 to 100
percent savings of titanium can be achieved by substituting
aluminum matrix composites with surface claddings of titanium
or nickel foil. Feasibilty of this clad composite concept
has been demonstrated. Another possibility for high
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temperature applications would be the substitution of
graphite-reinforced copper. While the specific strength
at low temperature for the reinforced copper is far less
than titanium, it is expected that at high temperatures,
its specific strength and stiffness will exceed that of
titanium. According to DOD estimates, a five-year program
costing approximately $100 million would be required to
explore and develop these options and provide substitutes
for titanium. [9:8-9]
Rapid solidification rate (RSR) technology, being
conducted by the Pratt and Whitney Company under the sponsor-
ship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and
the Air Force, may alleviate the extensive defense uses of
chromium and cobalt. Continuing research is being conducted
on this process which can produce nickel alloy mixtures
hertofore unknown in the form of an ultrafine powder. These
alloys, essentially depleted of chromium and cobalt, are
based primarily on other strengthening agents such as molyb-
denum and aluminum which are more readily available. [9:9]
In seemingly direct response to Senator Schmitt's
earlier cited statement about misguided U. S. foreign policy,
ever since his election, President Reagan has sounded the
theme of a new "constructive'* tilt in U. S. relations with
strategically important countries, particularly South Africa.
This theme appears to be the beginning of a movement away
from a foreign policy based on worldwide preservation of
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human rights to a more pragmatic one based on national
economic and defense interests.
The world's oceans are enormous untapped repositories
for a large number of minerals. Aside from hydrocarbons,
greatest interest has centered on manganese nodules--deep
seabed mineral deposits containing nickel, copper, cobalt,
and manganese—which lie virtually uncovered on the ocean
floor, anywhere from 1000 feet to 20,000 feet beneath the
ocean surface. An estimate for the total quantity of
nodules lying on the Pacific seabed alone is 1.66 trillion
metric tons. Based on projections that by 1980 manganese
nodule mining would have reached a volume of between 13 million
and 17 million dry tons per annum, seabed mining would have
contributed the following percentages to world production:
cobalt 55%; manganese— 48%; nickel— 23%; plus small per-
centages of copper, vanadium, zinc, and molybdenum. [3:various]
Unfortunately, no nodule mining was performed in
1980. The major obstacle preventing such mining is that
the nodules are located in international ocean areas in
which no state has clearly defined rights (or prohibitions
against) mineral exploitation.
At the behest of the United States, in 197 2, the
United Nations chartered the United Nations Conference on
Law of the Sea to agree on an acceptable arrangement for
mutual benefit from deep seabed mining. In August 1980,
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the Ninth Session of the Third Conference was held in
Geneva, No final treaty emerged. In anticipation of such
a treaty, however, the United States government has already
passed into law the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act which authorizes U. S. companies to begin commercial
mining after 1 January 1988. [13:121] Most estimates agree
that it will be 1990 at the earliest before the oceans
play a major supply role.
The last two major areas of initiatives are directed
at improving the position of the National Defense Stockpile
and at better utilization of the Defense Production Act(DPA).
They are looked at together because better utilization of
the DPA will improve the status of the Stockpile.
FEMA has proposed the introduction of a guaranteed
purchase program for cobalt under authority of Title III
of the DPA. Under this program the government would guarantee
to purchase a maximum of 41 million pounds of cobalt at
a fixed purchase price below current market price during
an eight-year program life. Any cobalt purchased by the
government would be held in the Stockpile against the 4 5
million pounds of outstanding required purchases at a lower
cost than is currently feasible. This program would result
in development of a domestic source for cobalt which, in
turn, reduces import dependence and vulnerability and in
acceleration of the achievement of the Stockpile goal
by at least 10 years at less cost. [7:7-9,323
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FEMA has also proposed such a guaranteed purchase
program, with virtually the same attendant benefits, for
titanium as part of a request to Congress for a $3 billion
borrowing authority against Title III of the DPA. Consent
to this authority would eliminate the appropriation re-
quirement imposed on Title III in 1974. Additional projects
proposed for using the $3 billion line of credit are opening
one or two cobalt mines and conducting additional substitute
materials research.
Outside the use of the Defense Production Act, the
government has undertaken recent steps to improve the status
of the National Defense Stockpile. $100 million has been
appropriated for the purchase of cobalt and other Stockpile
materials—the first major purchase since 1961. An additional
$100 million has been included in the FY1982 budget request.
Legislation is also pending in the House which would eleiminate
the requirement for appropriation authority to use funds from
the Transaction Fund.
2. Recommendations
In addition to current initiatives, different govern-
ment agencies have also made recommendations
,
such as those
which follow, that have not as yet come to fruition.
Secretary of the Interior Watt has urged more ex-
ploration for minerals on federal lands stating that the
best answer to long-term minerals availability is domestic
production. [30:61] At the current buying pace, rebuilding
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the Stockpile will not be completed until the year 2 041;
whereas establishing a domestic source cuts the stockpile
goal for a mineral by 3 units for every 1 unit of annual
production.
In virtually all of his statements and subcommittee
reports, Rep. Santini's overriding recommendation is for a
coordinated national non-fuel minerals policy developed and
administered by one central authority. Eis National Minerals
Security Bill of 1981 [H-R. 33643 proposes both. Section
2 01 Ca) proposes a Council on Minerals and Materials composed
of three presidentially appointed members who shall have
vested in them all responsibilities, with commensurate
authority, for administering national policy and for champion-
ing the cause for responsible minerals production and con-
sumption. [ "35: 4-5 3
As previously mentioned, Mr. Krueger feels the bill
has no chance of passing because Congress is awaiting the
outcome of the Cabinet Council's research and study.
Various government agencies and officials including
Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci; former Commander, Air
Force Systems Command, Gen. Alton Slay; and members of the
Defense Industrial Base Panel have been increasingly trum-
peting the benefits of multiyear contracting. Although
there are currently some statutory obstacles precluding full
use of multiyear contracting, the perceived benefits of
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early purchase of long-lead critical materials, the stabili-
zation of defense-related procurements, and the estimated
annual cost savings of 10 to 15 percent all increase the
desires to utilize multiyear to the fullest. [5:34 ]
Former Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering William J. Perry proposed a "more imaginative"
policy for the Stockpile, using it not only in emergencies,
but to ease long-lead problems associated with defense
production. [29:55] This researcher has dubbed this pro-
posal the "economic stockpile," a term to be used again in
the course of this thesis. Interviews with members of FEMA
have revealed that agency to be less than enthusiastic about
taking on responsibility for this type of stockpile.
Other recommendations which have been set forth are
CD tax relief for mining and minerals industries, (2) ac-
celerated depreciation for capital assets, (3) revision or
easing of antitrust statutes, and (4) a more realistic
approach by regulatory agencies.
F . SUMMARY
The investigation of this country's non-fuel minerals
status did not commence with any fervor until after World
War I, the event which marked the United States' first
experience with shortages. Many studies and laws and
policies have since been generated causing the involvement
of a host of different government agencies.
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There exist among these documents, policies, and agencies
many instances of overlapping authority, jurisdictional
disputes, confusion, and conflicts. Each agency is con-
ducting its operations according to its honest interpre-
tations of the chartering legislation. The problems cited
above result from the absence of a unified national non-
fuel minerals policy administered by a central coordinating
agency or council.
Government agencies and officials have in recent years
been initiating various programs and plans whose purposes
are to continually improve the strategic and critical
materials situation. Furthermore, there are also awaiting




V. PRIVATE INDUSTRY'S POLICIES AND INVOLVEMENT
WITH STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter dealt with governmental policies
regarding strategic and critical materials and with what
governmental initiatives are being undertaken to alleviate
some of the current problems.
This chapter will examine what difficulties industry
has encountered in the past and which ones still prevail
as a result of some of those government policies. Also
to be discussed will be what private industry is doing on
its own to overcome some of these burdens.
B. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED REGARDING STRATEGIC AND
CRITICAL MATERIALS
1. Instability of Governmental Policies and Programs
One of the facts revealed by the Defense Industrial
Base Panel during their hearings on the defense industrial
base was that government procurement programs were too un-
stable. [5:18]
A group of sub-tier contractors stated this instabil-
ity was one of the main factors contributing to the failing
health of their sector of the industrial base, and that they
would much rather do business with the commercial sector
because it was much more predictable and stable. [5:13-14]
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Weapon system procurement rates are constantly ad-
justed so that it is virtually impossible for defense in-
dustry to do any long-range planning and to effect efficient
procurement of long-lead subsystems and components. As
an example, of the 47 major defense acquisition programs in
effect as of 31 December 1980, 39 had undergone quantity
changes (19 increases and 20 decreases) and 41 had experi-
enced schedule changes. [4:13] Notwithstanding the dis-
ruptions caused by these changes, the real anxieties afflict-
ing contractors arise from the possibility of programs being
terminated completely.
A very good representative example of an industry
which has been adversely affected by this instability is
the titanium industry. As mentioned in Chapter III, the
problems are not in supplies of rutile but in processing
rutile into titanium sponge.
Since 1948, when the U. S. titanium industry was
born, until the present, titanium demand has been almost
solely a product of uses in defense equipment and commercial
aircraft. Consequently, the market has been extremely erratic
over the last 30-some years.
Because of large anticipated government contracts,
a number of companies entered the supply market in the
1950 's. A shift in defense strategy and spending in mid-
decade from airplanes to missiles, however, caused several
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major producers (Dow Chemical, E.I,, du Pont de Nemours, and
Union Carbide) to withdraw from the field. [37:D4]
The remaining three producers (RMI Company, Oregon
Metallurgical Corporation, and Titanium Metals Corporation
of America) have twice more been left holding the bag after
having expanded production capacity in anticipation of large
increases in demand from the aerospace industry—once with
the government's decision to abandon development of the
supersonic transport and once with the cancellation of the
B-l bomber program [16:57]
With the Reagan Administration's emphasis on defense
spending and the possibility of reviving production of the
B-l, the titanium industry has already begun expanding
capacity. Dow Chemical and Howmet, Inc., for example, are
opening a new processing plant. Industry officials, however,
are quite wary of the fact that the instability still re-
mains and that the rug may be pulled out from under their
feet at any time.
2. Excessive Stifling and Unreasonable Governmental
Regulations and Policies
In addition to the instability of government pro-
grams mentioned above, there are many government regulations
and policies which quite effectively choke off productive
efforts by private industry to eliminate or alleviate some
of the problems associated with strategic and critical
materials. These regulations and policies affect the full
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gamut of strategic and critical materials industries from
mineral exploration and mining to ore processing to fab-
rication of end products made from the processed metals.
One obstacle barring the mining industry from making
large strides toward eliminating this country's dependence
on foreign sources is the government's reluctance to open
public lands to minerals exploration and mining. Approxi-
mately one-third of the nation's lands, some 750 million
acres, is publicly owned. Mining uses less than 6 million
acres of public lands. In contrast, farm lands use 1.3
billion acres, highways cover 24 million acres, and air-
ports and railroads cover 6.5 million acres.
In his testimony before the Defense Industrial Base
Panel, Rep. Santini voiced his concern by saying:
"Our Government, over the past 10 years, has
made fundamental errors with respect to use or
nonuse of public lands for mineral development.
Instead, Government policies have proven to be
counterproductive and discouraging to the dis-
covery and development of mineral deposits. We
have put every conceivable roadblock in the way.
The most deplorable aspect of this short-
sightedness about public land use is that it is
being done without knowledge of the losses in-
volved. There has been no attempt to understand
the long-term impacts. There is no government
accountability to weigh the consequences. There
have been numerous instances where public lands
have been withdrawn when they were known to have
mineral potential.
In 197 4, one study estimated that we had
prohibited or restricted mineral development
under the mining law on two-thrids of our public
lands.
We hear a lot of "regulatory reform", but
all I have seen to date are cosmetic references
to that phrase. The most difficult thing for me
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to grasp is that our dedicated but tunnel-
vision regulators will be satisfied with nothing
short of perfection. They refuse to even con-
sider the alternatives. Perfection becomes a
safe refuge in the bureaucratic process. It
has created the expectations in the public mind
that the only safe standard is "zero risk". [5:27-28]
In addition to restrictions on the use of public
lands, the mining industry is beset by many other stifling
laws and regulations.
According to General Slay the list of federal re-
strictions on mineral exploration is extensive. They in-
clude land management and land use restrictions such as
the Clean Air Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
Wilderness Act, Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. [28:111-11]
Currently, there are 80 different laws administered
by 20 different federal agencies which directly or indi-
rectly affect the domestic non-fuel minerals industry
overall. [5:28] Ones associated with requirements of
safety, environment, health, energy, and equal employment
have diverted large smounts of business capital from in-
vestment in new equipment and facilities.
The 'Clean Air Act of 1977, for example, has driven
up production costs in the metals industry as much as 25 per-
cent without increasing output.
According to industry estimates, the copper industry
would have to spend $3 billion by 1985 to meet existing
environmental and health and safety regulations. Such a
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diversion of funds from investment in productive facilities
would result in a 17 percent decline in the domestic output
of refined copper.
Because many producers in the lead industry do not
have the technology or the money to meet new exposure
standards set by the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration, they are now shipping 150,000 tons of scrap
per year overseas to be processed, a tripling of 1975 ex-
port levels. [24:48]
In the past decade, over 400 foundries, which fab-
ricated products using strategic metals, have gone out of
business, primarily because of Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) requirements. [25:15]
Another area restrictive and counterproductive to
the industry is the inflexibility of government procure-
ment regulations which discourage the use of contract types
that would promote the best interests of all concerned.
The use of multiyear contracting has been touted as the
vehicle to be used to inject stability into defense pro-
curement programs. Widespread use of multiyear contracting,
however, has been thwarted by (1) Department of Defense
Directive 7200.4 which requires that all units of the weapon
system to be procured must be fully funded in the year in
which they are to be bought, (2) by Section 810 of the Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976
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which imposes a cancellation costs ceiling of $5 million per
contract, and (3) by Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR)
section 1-322 which disallows, in case of cancellation, re-
covery of recurring costs for labor or materials, or other
expenses, which might be incurred for performance of sub-
sequent program year requirements. [5:31,34,36]
The 1982 Department of Defense appropriation bill
currently being debated in Congress has attached to it an
amendment whose purpose is to eliminate at least one of the
above obstacles by raising the cancellation ceiling from
$5 million to $100 million.
When contracting with the Federal Government, the
metals fabrication industry, as well as all other industries,
must comply with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) pro-
mulgated by the now defunct Cost Accounting Standards
Board. CAS 409, as incorporated into the Defense Acquisi-
tion Regulation, states, "...allowable depreciation shall not
exceed the amounts used for book and statement purposes..."
[5:44]
The effect of CAS 409 is to require depreciation,
used for contract cost purposes, to be based on the historical
or economical useful life of capital assets— a much slower
rate than that used for income tax purposes. Thus, the
contractor must maintain two sets of books—one for govern-
ment contracting and one for tax purposes. The result is
the government absorbs part of the cost of maintaining this
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dual system, and the contractor becomes disgruntled not only
because of the dual paper work but also because depreciation
must be charged against a government contract at a much
lower rate.
Another cost accounting standards requirement
directly detrimental to industries dependent on strategic
materials is the stipulation that inventories used in perfor-
mance of government contracts can only be charged to those
contracts at a rate equivalent to the purchase cost of those
inventories vice one related to current market values. This
restriction makes private industry reluctant to stockpile
long leadtime strategic materials.
Net results of the above laws and regulations are
less productivity, greater dependence on foreign sources
for supplies of strategic raw materials, and fewer numbers
of contractors willing to do business in the defense
industrial base.
C. VIEWS ON GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR IMPROVEMENT
Via published articles, advertisements, and telephone
and personal interviews conducted by this researcher,
industrialists associated with the strategic materials
industries have opined thoughts that their operating en-
vironment is less than optimal due to certain governmental
policies. The following sections discuss their most
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frequently expressed opinions on laws and regulations and some
suggested recommendations on how to improve them.
1. Instability of Government Acquisition Programs
The government must do a better job of deciding
earlier what it wants and how many units it needs; and then
must only change programs if absolutely necessary. A group
of sub-tier contractors intimated to the Defense Industrial
Base Panel that because of the risks involved in government
programs due to the instability, "...the price difference
for performing Government contracts ranged from 25 percent
to double the price charged for comparable commercial con-
tracts." [5:14] A greater emphasis on long-range planning
is needed to stabilize the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)
,
and greater use of multiyear contracting needs to be effected.
2. Multiyear Contracting
According to the Defense Science Board, multiyear
contracting could potentially result in cost savings of
10 to 15 percent (in constant dollars). [25:68] Multiyear
contracting needs to be utilized to a greater extent. Ob-
stacles to enhanced use need to be eliminated or mitigated.
A mechanism needs to be devised by which general full funding
can be appropriated in the first year of the multiyear con-
tract so contractors can take advantage of economic-lot-size
buys of long-lead strategic raw materials and components
which will be used throughout the program life. Department
of Defense Directive 7200.4, "Full Funding of DOD Procurement
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Programs," requires that each annual appropriation request
must contain funds requests to cover the total costs to be
incurred in completing the delivery of a given quantity of
useable end items. This restrictive direction should be
revised to allow procurement of long-lead materials quantities
which will be used for more than one year. The cancellation
liability ceiling of $5 million on multiyear contracts must
be increased. At present this ceiling severely limits the
use of multiyear contracting to low dollar value acquisition
programs. The Defense Acquisition Regulation section 1-322
which restricts government liability for cancellation costs
in case of contract termination to only non-recurring costs
should be revised to allow payment for recurring costs such
as labor charges, etc.
The unanimous sentiment of the companies interviewed
was that much greater use of multiyear contracting was de-
sired and needed.
3. Opening More Public Lands for Minerals Exploration
When expressing their opinions on the question of
opening public lands to minerals exploration and mining
development, the companies agreed that greater utilization
of these lands was needed for the country's benefit. They
also expressed, however, that what was sought was not carte
blanche access to these lands (they fully appreciate the
environmental considerations), but a more realistic,
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cooperative approach toward compromising on a trade-off
between environmental concerns and economic and defense
needs of the nation.
4. Government Regulations and Agencies
Although not expressed as strongly by some as others,
the general feeling among the contractors was that the
burgeoning amounts of government red tape and regulations
were uncalled for and counterproductive.
Stated more emphatically was that the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration were unrealistic and inflexible in their
requirements. The requirements themselves were also considered
unjustified and expensive and were contributing significantly
to the production stagnation in the defense industrial base.
5. National Defense Stockpile
There was no disagreement that the National Defense
Stockpile was needed. The general consensus was that
established goals should be met, and that the stockpiled
materials needed upgrading. Notwithstanding this unanimity,
several individual recommendations were made. RMI Company
suggested that. .
.
"long term contracts for replenishement and re-
building of the Stockpile would be one means to
give domestic industry the incentive to go even
further in current expansion plans and programs.
It would insure both a complete stockpile, and
the productive capacity to respond to critical
or surge requirements." [32:6]
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Timet Inc., one of the three U. S. major titanium
processors, recommended that materials be stockpiled more in
processed forms vice raw material forms to decrease pro-
duction leadtime and manufacturing resources required if
use of the strategic materials were necessary. Timet also
suggested a materials rotation program in which the govern-
ment would trade or sell materials to industry to preclude
obsolescence and deterioration.
6. Economic Stockpile
Because the National Defense Stockpile cannot be
used for economic purposes, other means must be developed to
smooth out supply and demand fluctuations in times other
than national emergencies. Earlier the researcher intro-
duced the term "economic stockpile." The question of
should there be an economic stockpile to level out the peaks
and valleys of strategic materials supply and demand in
times when no national emergency exists was posed to inter-
viewees by the researcher. Because the concept of an
economic stockpile has never been attempted, the details of
its structure and operation are not as yet available.
In general, however, the economic stockpile would be
divorced from the National Defense Stockpile in administra-
tion if not physical location, it would be managed by either
government personnel or private industrialists depending on
guidelines established, and the commodities would be
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available for use by government contractors whenever supply
shortages warranted.
The opinions were mixed with the yeas and nays being
fairly equal. Those who did not favor an economic stock-
pile said that better long-range planning and strategies
would negate the need for an economic stockpile concept,
and they favored this long-range thinking to a reactive,
stop-gap stockpile.
Of those who favored an economic stockpile, the
majority felt the government should not manage it. Peter
Flawn, Director, Bureau of Economic Geology, The University
of Texas, summarized the majority opinion very well when he
wrote:
"If a materials reserve apart from the strategic
stockpile were to be established to operate as an
efficient economic stabilizer, it would require
continuing purchases to make up for disposition
by sales with an acquisitional approval for each
transaction. Such a stockpile or materials reserve
puts the government in the market place as a buyer
and seller of minerals, permits the government to
set and control prices, and in short is a further
step toward a managed economy." [11:201]
These same opponents to an additional government-
run stockpile also stressed that a private-industry-run
stockpile would be fraught with problems and potential





Several recommendations were proffered by individual
contractors, but they failed to receive the degree of con-
sensus or sense of urgency as those already listed. The
following is a list of those recommendations.
a. The government should encourage private in-
dustry to increase research and development (R&D)
efforts toward discovering substitutes for stra-
tegic materials. This encouragement could be
manifested through tax benefits, or grants, or
R&D contracts.
b. There should be established a national minerals
policy to guide all involved agencies toward com-
mon goals. According to Flawn, "Any mineral policy
must concern itself with the health of the domestic
industry and its capabilities, foreign mineral
trade, national security, and environmental con-
siderations. "[ 11:202]
c. All ramifications of embargoes and sanctions
against strategic materials producing countries
must be weighed thoroughly before this type of
action is taken. The Defense Science Board,
for example, iterated that "sanctions on South
Africa and Rhodesia are "stupid" considering their
effect on our economy and national security." [25:138]
d. Tariffs and export controls need to be im-
plemented in order to assist domestic minerals
producers in competing with foreign producers.
e. Use Title III of the Defense Production Act of
1950 to expand the productive capacity of the
domestic strategic minerals industry.
D. PRIVATE INDUSTRY'S INTERNAL INITIATIVES
Private industry has by no means been expending all
its efforts in criticism of the government's policies and
programs, or lack thereof. They have engaged in an ample
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number of internal initiatives directed at solving some of
the problems confronting them.
As an example of the magnitude of the desire to im-
prove the strategic materials situation, in May 1980, several
hundred concerned executives of major U. S. companies at-
tended a conference in Pittsburgh entitled "Resource War
in 3-D" (the three D's stood for dependency, diplomacy, and
defense) . [ 18:43]
Production capacity expansion is either being seriously
investigated or actually on-going. For example, Hanna,
Noranda, and Anschutz mining companies are considering the
possibility of reopening the cobalt mines in Blackbird,
Idaho and Fredericktown, Missouri. Plans to invest in
domestic cobalt refining capability, which is as essential
as ore mining to the U. S. import-dependency status, are
also being explored, but are quite tentative at present. L 7 : 5]
In the titanium industry expansion is actually occurring
with more expected in the future. RMI Company completed
a 26 percent expansion (from 15 million to 19 million
pounds) in July 1980, and it could rapidly expand again by
4-, 8-, or 12-million more pounds if the markets should
warrant such actions. Timet Division of TMCA will expand
production in 1982 to 32 million pounds (from 30 million)
.
And Dow Chemical Company and Howmet Corporation have just
recently entered the market via a joint venture. [132:20]
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The Cabot Corporation, one of the world's leading sup-
pliers of super alloys essential for the manufacture of
jet engines, viewed the strategic metals and minerals
markets as important enough to establish a new division,
Cabot Mineral Resources, whose mandate is to concentrate
purely upon questions of short and long term availability
of critical minerals supplies for Cabot's operating divi-
sions. The division's responsibilities range from tradi-
tional procurement to minerals exploration and even mine
ownership. [2:2]
Research and development efforts in the areas of sub-
stitution for critical materials by newly-developed or
previously-known materials and of improved production tech-
niques show great promise in alleviating dependence on
foreign sources.
Magnesium refractories, titanium, nickel, and manganese
have been used successfully in different applications as
acceptable substitutes for chromium. [1:12 J Substitution
of other available alloys in one military jet engine vane
resulted in a savings of 65,000 pounds of cobalt in 1980. [26:4]
Current research whose favorable results would have a
potentially monumental impact on strategic materials de-
pendence is being done on transforming abundant iron into
steel of remarkable toughness and corrosion resistance—all
without the use of such strategic materials as chromium
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and cobalt. The alloy, generically dubbed "super-iron",
can be produced invarious ways depending on the qualities
desired.
The most promising technique involves manipulating the
crystalline structure of alloys made up of iron and such
inexpensive substances as silicon, boron, and carbon. Called
rapid quenching, or cooling, this technique literally freezes
these alloys in their liquid state. Ultra-fast solidification
results in novel materials so homogeneous that, like glass,
they have no grain structure at all. In fact, these alloys
are called metallic glass, or Metglas (a trade name of Allied
Chemical) . Metglass is three to four times as strong as the
toughest steel alloys and up to 100 times as corrosion-
resistant as the best stainless steel. The only drawback
is that the metallic glasses developed so far become brittle
at 400 to 700 degrees F. , which presently rules them out
for high temperature uses. A compromise material called
microcrystalline alloys processed through metal atomization
are less corrosion-resistant but are just as hard and can
take much higher temperatures. The alloys, costing no
more than steel alloys made with cobalt, tungsten, and molyb-
bdenum, can withstand temperatures as high as 2000 degrees
Fahrenheit.
The corrosion resistance of stainless steel is also
being attained, without the use of chromium, by coating
ordinary steel with metallic glass and microcrystalline
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alloys and by implanting into it ions of other elements such
as cobalt or plentiful nitrogen. [17:71]
Additional research in the areas of powder metallurgy
made possible by a technology breakthrough called rapid
solidification rate (RSR) , diffusion bonding techniques
which permit use of lower-cost, lower performance alloys in
less demanding areas of structural components, and iso-
thermal forging and hot-isostatic pressing which allow nearer-
to-net-shape forming of large forgings also hold much
promise for beneficial results.
E . SUMMARY
The instability of government acquisition programs, the
excessive amount of counterproductive policies and regulations,
and the proliferation of government agencies impacting on
private industry have all contributed to stifling growth in
the strategic and critical materials industries. In fact,
in some instances such as the titanium industry, production
capacity actually dropped for some years.
Firms associated with the strategic materials industry
have very definite views on the government's role and policies
and also hold ideas on how to improve them, e.g. multiyear
contracting, opening public lands to minerals exploration,
and improvement of stockpile management.
Private industry, through various means such as research
and development projects, industry-wide conferences, and
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production capacity expansion, has taken its own initiatives
to alleviate the U. S. dependence on foreign sources for
strategic and critical materials.
Analysis of the information presented in this chapter





a', how strategic and critical materials affect the
acquisition of major weapon systems
Virtually every mineral and even some of the non-mineral
materials listed in Table 1, Appendix A, are used in the
manufacture of major weapon systems. Furthermore, most of
these materials cannot be replaced in the systems by sub-
stituting any other material, except possibly another stra-
tegic material. Chapter II illustrated just how extensively
the manufacture of weapon systems is dependent upon strategic
and critical materials. Although the illustration was con-
fined to using just three of the ninety-three materials
—
chromium, cobalt, and titanium—without exception, every
major weapon system is built utilizing one, two, or all
three of the materials either directly or indirectly through
use of superalloys or components derived from them.
It would, therefore, seem very likely that the availa-
bility of these strategic materials, their prices, and the
leadtimes they command for delivery would have a direct
correlative effect on the availiability, prices, and delivery
times of major weapon systems. Chapter III illustrates that
this correlation in fact exists.
Although inflation and other economic and political
factors certainly play a role in raising the costs of
weapons, the 50 percent increase in the price of chromium
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in 1977, the 1978 cobalt price increase from $4-7 to $25 per
pound, and the 77 percent increase in titanium prices in
1980 have also had dramatic impacts on weapons costs. For
example, the price rise in cobalt alone caused price in-
creases of $18,000 for each F-100 jet engine, $21,000 for
each J-79 engine, and $12,000 for each TF-34 engine—all of
which are used on front-line military aircraft.
Furthermore, although the leadtimes necessary to acquire
strategic and critical materials and components made from
them are not the sole causes of increasing delivery times
for weapon systems, they are definitely significant con-
tributors. In 1976, average leadtime to obtain titanium
sponge was 40 weeks; in 1980, leadtime had increased to
104 weeks. Large titanium forgings, which were delivered in
70 weeks in 1978, took 180 weeks in 1980. Delivery schedules
for extrusions have increased from 65 weeks to 108 weeks.
And small, but absolutely critical items such as titanium
bolts and fasteners underwent delivery time increases of 32
to 62 weeks and 25 to 58 weeks, respectively. The chain is
continued as leadtimes for titanium landing gears have ex-
panded from 52 to 120 weeks; F-100 engines delivery has
increased from 19 to 41 months; TF-3 4 engines now take 3 9
months to be received vice 20 months in 1977. The ultimate
result of the above increases is that it now takes 2 2 percent
longer to get an operational F-15 fighter aircraft into the
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defense arsenal, 34 percent longer for an A-10, and 50 per-
cent longer for an F-16.
Notwithstanding the importance of the above facts, they
pale when compared to the possibility of not being able to
build major weapons at any price. Although unlikely, this
possibility does exist if one imagines the scenario of total
cutoff of strategic materials supplies from foreign sources.
This scenario, albeit with many intricacies and details ex-
cluded, is a basis for the existence of the National Defense
Stockpile— to support the U. S. economy's needs for strategic
and critical materials for a period of three years in the
event of supply interruption. Can the Stockpile, in its
present status, accomplish that purpose? The answer is no.
Over 60 percent of the line items are below established
inventory goals— 37 percent are below 50 percent. There is
growing concern that some of the materials, transferred to
the Stockpile in the 1950' s, are no longer of the requisite
quality. Nor are the materials being stockpiled in the prop-
er forms—more upgraded forms requiring less production
leadtime upon use are being promoted to be better.
Therefore, postulation can be made that in the event of
a national emergency in which supply lines of strategic
materials from foreign sources would be severed, the United
States could possibly find itself without the materials
necessary to manufacture the weapons for its defense arsenal.
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It can, therefore, be said that strategic and critical
materials affect the acquisition of major weapons systems
through increased prices which decrease the number of units
that can be bought with a fixed budget or force the accept-
ance of lower performance, less quality products, through
increased leadtimes which result in obsolete units entering
the arsenal, and through the possibility of the delivery
of no weapons due to the unavailability of the materials
necessary to build them.
B. HOW GOVERNMENT POLICIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE CURRENT
SITUATION
As will be substantiated by details and examples, in the
past, government's position on national interests whose
satisfactory attainment depends on the availability of
reasonably priced strategic and critical materials has been
marked by a lack of coordinated efforts, overlapping legis-
lation and agencies jurisdictions, and unreasonable, short-
sighted policies which have stifled the related industries
—
there is no single national policy nor a central agency de-
signated to formulate and administer one.
This lack of a national policy and a single point of
integrative responsibility has perpetuated the existence of
some 20 uncoordinated agencies administering 8 laws and has
allowed conflict to flourish among those agencies. An
example is those agencies whose raison d'etre is conservation
of national resources and protection of the environment and
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the American people, and those agencies and industries which
advocate minerals exploration and development in the name of
national survival.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) are
members of the former group. Mining and minerals processing
industries, foundries, smelting companies, and forging and
casting industries are examples of the latter. Following
are some examples of how these opposing sides interact
and how pertinent laws and regulations affect them.
As one legislative example, the Clean Air Act of 1977,
whose implementation is the responsibility of the EPA, has
driven up production costs for the metals industries as
much as 25 percent without increasing output. And, accord-
ing to industry estimates, the copper industry would have to
spend $3 billion by 1985 to meet existing environmental,
health, and safety regulations. Such a diversion of funds
from investment in productive facilities would result in
a 17 percent decline in domestic output of refined copper.
Lastly, in the past decade, over 400 foundries, which fab-
ricated products using strategic materials, have gone out of
business primarily because of EPA and OSHA requirements.
The intention of Congress in the passage of the Mining
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 was to pass to the Department
of the Interior the responsibility for formulating and
implementing a national policy. In the opinion of Congress,
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Interior had abdicated that responsibility for a decade;
and their distress resulted in passage of the National
Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act
of 1980. Although their motives were justified and sincere
and it is still too early to pass final judgment on the
total value of the Act, it can be said that at present the
Act has caused even more confusion over which agency has
overall policy responsibility and has moved the country
little closer to a unified national policy.
Instability of government procurement programs has
also contributed to the current situation. It has contributed
significantly to the failing health of the subcontractor
tier of the defense industrial base. These same subcon-
tractors have confessed that this instability has obligated
them to charge the government 25 to 100 percent more than
that billed to commercial companies.
These subcontractors, as well as prime contractors, also
lament the restrictive and inflexible procurement regulations
which prohibit the discretionary use of the contract type
most beneficial to all concerned—the multiyear contract.
Estimates have been proffered that suggest the government
loses 10 to 15 percent of its annual appropriations due to
lack of its use. Whether or not these figures are accurate
is not of the greatest significance. What is important is
the recognition that the obstacles to the use of multiyear
113

need to be removed so true discretionary use of it can be
applied when in the best interests of all concerned.
Another plus factor for the argument of establishing
a national non-fuel minerals policy along with a responsible
agency is a "foreign policy not in tune with reality." Al-
though a foreign policy based on the - promotion and preser-
vation of human rights was a penchant of the Carter Admini-
stration and is no longer in vogue in the present one, it
is indicative of what can happen to the strategic materials
interests when there is no central advocate to champion
its cause. It seems inconceivable that sanctions in the
name of human rights (although an admirable ideal) can be
levied against countries vital to our supplies of irreplace-
able strategic materials, and thus our national defense,
when viewed from the aspect of possible consequences.
Another major area in which government's policies and
actions have caused significant repercussions is in the use
of the inventories of the National Defense Stockpile. The
manipulations of the goal levels, the threats of market dumps
of materials to depress prices, and the sale of Stockpile
commodities to balance the federal budget have resulted in
annoying our foreign suppliers, in keeping the Stockpile in
a perpetual state of inadequacy, and in discouraging private




Lastly, a decade's lack of a realistic attitude on the
use of public lands for minerals exploration and production
has prevented the mining industry from making any significant
inroads into eliminating U. S. dependence on foreign sources.
Far from advocating a return to an irresponsible attitude
on use and abuse of natural resources, this researcher firmly
believes a rational compromise must be reached between legiti-
ment concerns for preserving the environment and pragmatic
needs for making use of it.
All of the above government policies have in some manner
contributed to the increasing leadtimes and prices and tenu-
ous availabilities related to strategic and critical materials.
Consequently, they also have significant effects on the
acquisition of major weapon systems.
C. WHAT IS BEING DONE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION
Both the government and private industry have been taking
various diverse initiatives directed at improving this
country's strategic and critical materials posture.
Several Congressional subcommittees and committees are
making in-depth, searching studies in this area. As ex-
amples, both Senator Harrison Schmitt's and Representative
Santini's subcommittees found profound problems that directly
impact on the nation's defense capability and stressed that
corrective action must be taken as quickly as possible.
The Executive Branch has also shown renewed interest.
President Reagan for instance has appointed the Cabinet Council
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on Natural Resources and the Environment whose charter is to
investigate the entire scope of the strategic and critical
materials arena.
Besides the dialogue being exchanged in the studies
noted above, extensive research and development efforts
are being sponsored by such agencies as FEMA and the Depart-
ments of Commerce/ Defense, and the Interior. Projects
include such areas as the advantages of stockpiling up-
graded forms of strategic materials vice ore forms, the
development of new mining technology, new methods of re-
covering minerals from new deposits, and many more.
The government, since the inauguration of President
Reagan, has also been taking steps toward improving re-
lationships with strategically important foreign countries
like South Africa by redirecting foreign policy away from
one largely dictated by the desire for worldwide acceptance
of America's ideal of human rights to one based on more
pragmatic precepts of the economic survival and defense of
the nation.
Further in the international arena, the United States
is continuing to take a very active role in the Conferences
on Law of the Sea in an attempt to secure a multinational
treaty which will allow mining and production of the vast




Lastly, FEMA is currently pushing for the adoption of
several programs and measures, which through utilization of
Title III of the Defense Production Act , will improve the
inventory levels of the National Defense Stockpile. Mean-
while, the agency is purchasing stocks of various materials
with funds appropriated for the first time since 1961.
While government has been exerting the above efforts,
private industry has by no means been sitting idle. Like
the government, these firms have been conducting conferences
on the subject in an attempt to discover some answers; and
they have been expending funds on research and development
which has produced some very promising results. In addition,
various companies have expanded production capacities and
more are contemplating similar action. Some companies,
such as Cabot Corporation, have gone as for as founding
a separate division whose sole responsibility is ensuring,
for its parent company, an adequate and reasonably priced
supply of strategic and critical materials.
So, it can be seen that interest and concern in the area
of strategic and critical materials are finally reaching a
level that is generating serious discussion and efforts
directed at improving the current posture of the industry
and the U. S. position. But problems are still present.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. WHAT MORE SHOULD BE DONE
Government officials and management in private corpora-
tions have expressed various recommendations of what more
needs to be done to overcome the remaining problems. The
following are those with which the researcher agrees, or
those which are uniquely his, and the reasons supporting
them.
From the evidence presented in this thesis, it has been
substantiated that strategic and critical materials are vital
and essential to the manufacture of major weapon systems.
It was also shown that increases in prices and lengthening
leadtimes for these materials were directly responsible for
a part of the price increases and extended delivery times
being experienced by virtually every major weapon system.
Also shown was how these prices and leadtime increases have
at least partially resulted from various governmental
policies, laws and agency dictates. Therefore, it can be
said that government policies regarding strategic and critical
materials have affected the acquisition of major weapon
systems, and that continued adequate defense capability
demands improvement of government's performance.
One area begging for improvement is the proliferation of
uncoordinated laws and agencies. With some exceptions,
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these laws and agencies serve useful, legitimate purposes.
However, redundancy, inefficiency, and failure of agencies
to realize the importance of other agencies 1 work result
in a less than optimal utilization of our nation's strategic
and critical materials resources.
What is needed is a rational, clearly defined national
non-fuel minerals policy administered and championed by one
centrally responsible agency. With its resources lying
within the Bureau of Mines, the Department of the Interior
is the logical choice to be this central coordinator. Be-
cause of the confusion that has been encircling the question
of which agency is in charge of national policy, it would
seem that what is needed to clear the air is either a
legislative mandate designating the Department of the Interior
as responsible or an executive order doing the same under the
auspices of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970.
Once a central responsible agency has been designated,
it must then make decisions on various issues and direct
work toward eliminating various problems. Following are
several recommendations on what that agency should promote.
Every effort should be made to stabilize government major
weapon procurement programs. Multiyear contracting would
be a step in this direction. It must, however, be recog-
nized that multiyear is not a panacea, and that before it
can be used effectively, full funding requirements, the $5
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million cancellation liability, and the prohibition against
charging recurring costs to cancellation charges must be
revised.
A major effort needs to be undertaken toward eliminating
the government laws and policies and agencies which are
stifling the productive efforts of the strategic and critical
materials industries. The EPA and OSHA, along with the
laws they implement, need to be perused to develop a com-
promise between what they desire regarding the environment
and what the country needs to maintain its defense capa-
bility. Serious review of public lands use for minerals
exploration must be made.
Other recommendations which need to be incorporated into
a national policy are encouragement of the domestic mining
and minerals processing industries through the liberaliza-
tion of depreciation rates and tax incentives for captial
equipment and facilities to be used in mining and minerals
production, the imposition of tariffs and export controls,
increased and less complicated use of Titles I and III of
the Defense Production Act, and close scrutiny of all ramifi-
cations resulting from embargoes and sanctions against
foreign suppliers of strategic materials.
The final area to be addressed is that of the Stockpile.
The National Defense Stockpile is a valid concept worthy
of efforts to improve its current status. Goals must be
filled, although these goals will come down if domestic
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production is increased. The quality of the materials
currently being held needs to be carefully scrutinized; if
lacking, GSA should take steps to barter them to industry
for higher quality materials or, barring acceptance by any
companies, dispose of them. Favorable consideration should
also be given to stocking more upgraded forms of materials
and less ore forms.
In addition to the National Defense Stockpile which
should only be used for national defense, there should also
be some sort of "economic stockpile 1 which can be used to
smooth out supply and demand fluctuations in the strategic
materials market. There was no consensus among the govern-
ment officials or the corporate officers interviewed as to
who should manage such a stockpile. Although the researcher
believes in the efficacy of an economic stockpile, much more
research is needed before it can become a reality.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the above information and that presented in the
previous six chapters, the following conclusions are drawn
and recommendations made by the researcher.
1. The price increases and lengthening leadtimes being
experienced by major weapon systems over the recent past
have been caused, at least in part, by concomitant increases
in prices and leadtimes for vital and essential strategic
and critical materials. At the same time, the price and
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leadtime increases for strategic and critical materials has
been caused, in part, by government laws, policies, and
agencies. There is, therefore, a correlative effect between
government policies regarding strategic and critical mater-
ials and the acquisition of major weapon systems.
2. Although best suited to the task of formulating and
implementing a national non-fuel minerals policy due to its
resources found in the Bureau of Mines and although directed
to do so by the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, the
Department of the Interior has abdicated this responsibility,
Thus, there is no single, coordinated national non-fuel
minerals policy, nor any single agency responsible for im-
plementing it. This lack of a coordinated policy and a
central agency has led to the following problems.
a. Overlaps in agencies jursidictions, conflicts,
confusion, inefficiencies, and detrimental impacts on the
strategic and critical materials industries.
b. Agencies such as the EPA and OSHA have been able
to implement policies injurious to the strategic and criti-
cal materials industries and responsible for lengthening
leadtimes and increasing prices for major weapon systems.
c. A foreign policy that is not in tune with the
economic and defense reality of the United States; one that
imposes embargoes and sanctions against foreign countries
who are vital to our supply of essential strategic materials
and thus our national defense.
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3. Management of the National Defense Stockpile, al-
though improved, is still less than optimal and must continue
on this trend of improvement.
a. Past use of the Stockpile for budgetary and other
purposes outside that of national defense have caused
annoyance of foreign suppliers, artificial depression of
domestic prices resulting in lack of incentive to develop
domestic sources of supply, low inventory levels of certain
Stockpile commodities, and stifling of productive expansion.
4. There has been within the last several years a sig-
nificant increase in concern regarding strategic and critical
materials by government officials. This growing concern has
resulted in congressional hearings; appointment of executive
branch study groups; and realization that industry is being
adversely affected by the proliferation of laws and regula-
tions and agencies, the lack of public land use for mineral
production, the instability of government procurement pro-
grams, and antiquated depreciation and tax rates.
5. The United States is dangerously import-dependent
for strategic and critical materials on unstable foreign
sources. Our national defense is thus vulnerable to dis-
ruption of those supplies for whatever reason. The domestic
mining and processing industries need to be encouraged to
develop the United States reserves of strategic and critical




a. This encouragement can be manifested through use
of Titles I and III of the Defense Production Act, by re-
sponsible imposition of tariffs and export restrictions,
and by changes to the antiquated depreciation, tax, and
antitrust laws mentioned earlier.
6. An economic stockpile concept of some sort would
help alleviate the effects of fluctuations in supply and
demand for strategic and critical materials. Although a
good concept, much more study must be given to the subject
to determine who would manage it and how, and whether it
would be a separate stockpile or just an adjunct to the
National Defense Stockpile.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The President should issue an executive order desig-
nating the Department of the Interior responsible for form-
ulating and administering a national non-fuel minerals
policy. All functions related to strategic and critical
materials such as research and development, must be coordi--
nated through that agency.
2. The United States posture regarding strategic and
critical materials available in case of a national emergency
must be improved. This improvement must be accomplished
via a two-pronged approach. First, production of domestic
reserves must be increased through use of the Defense Pro-
duction Act and incentives such as accelerated depreciation
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methods, tax incentives, and less strict antitrust laws.
Secondly, inventory goal levels for the National Defense
Stockpile must be met as soon as possible. This objective
can be achieved by congressional appropriation of funds
to procure more foreign supplies and by guaranteed purchase
programs of domestically produced materials using Defense
Production Act authority and funds.
3. The concept of an economic stockpile should be
pursued. Further study is required to determine how best to






Explanation of Table 1
The National Defense Stockpile total inventory as given
in Table 1 excludes quantities that were sold but not shipped
from depots to the purchasers. In the Statistical Supplement
(available from GSA) the inventory is listed as "Total Inven-
tory in Storage" with a separate line for "Unshipped Sales."
The Table 1 inventory quantities combine stockpile and
nonstockpile grade materials, while separate lines can be
found for each type in the Statistical Supplement. Some
nonstockpile grade materials were acquired by transfer of
government-owned surpluses after World War II or through
Defense Production Act purchase programs. Other materials
were of stockpile grade when acquired, but no longer qualify
because of changes in industry practices. Nonstockpile
grade material may vary only slightly from the stockpile
grade and in some cases is temporarily credited toward goals.
For some materials where a goal deficit occurs, the
excess of another form of that material is held to offset
the shortage as indicated in the footnotes at the end of
Table 1. The term "offset" means allocating one form of a
material for an equivalent amount of another form.
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Materials are grouped by "families 1' and a summary line
for each basic family group is included. The materials have
been grouped in each family according to their status as raw
material, semifinished products or finished products that
contain the same common ingredient. The values shown in
the summary line for each family group are expressed in the
basic unit common to all members of the group. In all but
three cases, this basic unit is the metal equivalent for
each form. There is a different conversion factor for each
form because each requires different technology and incurs
different conversion losses. The factors used for calcu-
lating these equivalent amounts and the calculation pro-
cedure are in Appendix B.
Market values are prices at which comparable materials
are being traded, or in the absence of trading, values
are estimates. They are not necessarily the amount that
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Jamaica I ypc LDT
Bauxite. Metal Grade.
Surinam Type LDT
. Aluminum Oxide, Abrasive





Bauxite. Abrasive Grade LCT
. Antimony ST
l. Asbestos, Amosite ST
i. Asbestos, Chrysotile ST
>. Bauxite. Refractory LCT
'. Beryllium Metal Group ST Be Metal
Beryl Ore (11', BeO) ST




J. Castor Oil (Sebacic Acid) LB
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36.000 40,730 163.7 4.730
17.000 42.534 21.9 25.534
3,000 9,958 8.9 6.958




18.000 17.98"' IK X 13
7.900 7.387 6' 2 513
400 229 64 1 ri
2,200.000 2,081,298 5.2 118.702
11.700.000 6J28.729 15.8 5.371.271
22.000.000 5.009.697 8.9 9.475,757'
1J53.0OO 1.173.230 1.033.8 179.770
















Chromium. Ferro, High Carbon .... ST
Chromium. Fcrro, Low Carbon ST
Chromium, r-crro. Silicon ST
Chromium. Metal ST
Chromite, Refractory Grade Ore . . . SDT
Cobalt LB Co
Columbium Group LB Cb Metal
Columbtum Carbide Powder .... LB Cb
Columbium Concentrates LB Cb
Columbium. Kerro LB Cb
Columbium. Metal LB Cb
Copper ST
Cordage Fibers. Abaca LB
Cordage Fibers, Sisal LB
Diamond, Industrial Group KT
Diamond Dies. Small PC
Diamond. Industrial. Crushing Bort . KT
Diamond. Industrial. Stones K.T
Feathers and Down LB
Fluorspar, Acid Grade SDT
Fluorspar, Metallurgical Grade ... SDT
Graphite, Natural, Ceylon,
Amorphous Lump ST
3.200.000 2.488.043 258.9 h
185.000 402.696 269 5 b
75.000 318.892 418 1 b
90.000 58.355 436 b
20.000 3.763 294 b
850,000 391,414 36.9 458.5X6




100.000 21.372 6 78.628
5.600,000 1 .780.463 29 3 c
930.91 1 6.0 c
44.851 1.8 c
1,000,000 29,048 65.1 970,952
155.000.000 - 155,000.000
60.000.000 - 60,000.000
29,700,000 42,929 .316 416.1 13.229,316
60.000 25.473 1 1 34.527
22.000.000 23.692.782 66.1 l.69;.^x:
7.700.00O 19.223.798 348.9 1 1.523 79*
1,500.000 - 1 .500.000
1.400.000 895.983 125.4 504.017
1.700.000 411.738 40.1 1.288.262









Goal Inventory (Millions S)
Quantity After Crediting Offs«
Excess Deficit
23. Graphite, Natural, Malagasy,
Crystalline ST
24. Graphite, Natural, Other than
Ceylon & Malagasy ST
25. Iodine LB
26. Jewel Bearings PC
27. Lead ST
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Manganese. Ferro. Silicon ST
Manganese Metal. Electrolytic ST
30. Mercury FL
31. Mica Muscovite Block,






























2.800 2,802 .5 2
5,800.000 8.013,074 47J 2,213,074
20.000,000 68.731.890 61.2 51.268.110










Goal Inventory (Millions S)
Quantity After Crediting Offset
Excess Deficit
32. Mica Muscovite Film,
First and Second Qualities LB
33. Mica Muscovite Splittings LB
34. Mica Phlogopite Block LB
35. Mica Phlogopite Splittings LB
36. Molybdenum Group LB Mo
Molybdenum Disulphide LB Mo
Molybdenum, Ferro LB Mo
37. Nickel ST Ni*Co
38. Opium Group AMA LB
Opium. Gum AMA LB
Opium, Salt AMA LB
39. Platinum Group Metals, Iridium . . Tr Oz
40. Platinum Group Metals,
Palladium Tr Oz
41. Platinum Group Metals,
Platinum Tr Oz
42. Pyrethnim LB
43. Quartz Crystals LB
44. Quinidine Av Oz
45. Quinine A v Oz
46. Rubber LT
47. Rutile SDT
90,000 1,274,495 14.9 1.184,495
12,630,000 19,546.395 39.1 6,916,395
210,000 130,745 .1
















3,000,000 1 ,255.003 282.4 1,744,997
1.31 0,000 452.640 215.0 857 .360
500.000 - 500,000
600.000 2.423,036 14.5 1.823.036
10.100.000 1.800.462 7.8 8.299.538
4,500,000 3.246.164 10.9 U53.836
850,000 119,208 209.6 730.792












Quantity After Crediting Offse
Excess Deficit
48. Saphire and Ruby KT
49. Silicon Carbide, Crude ST
50. Silver. Fine Tr 0/
51. Talc, Steatite Block and Lump ST
52. Tantalum Group LB Ta Metal
Tantalum. C arbide Powder LB la
1 antalum Metal IB la
I amalum Minerals LB Ta
53. Thorium Nitrate LB
54. Tin LT
55. Titanium Sponge ST
56. Tungsten Group LB W Metal
Tungsten Carbide Powder IB W
I ungsten. Terro LB V\
Tungsten. Metal Powder LB W
I ungsten Ores & Concentrates. . . I B W
57. Vanadium Group ST V Metal
Vanadium. Ferro ST V
V anadium Pentoxidc ST V
58. Vegetable Tannin Extract,
Chestnut LT
59. Vegetable Tannin Extract,
Quebracho LT




29,000 80.548 36.2 51.548
139^00,000 3,113.6 139,500,000











600,000 7,146,312 19.7 6,546,312
42,000 200,472 3,585.1 158.472
195,000 32,331 431.8
















































a. Aluminum Oxide, Fused Crude: hold 249.864 ST ol fused crude as olfset against 208,220 ST of aluminum oxide, abrasive grain.
b Chromium Group, Chemical and Metallurgical Grades: metallurgical grade ore goal is 3,200.000 SDT ol specification grade;
inventory 1.956.824 SDT: shortfall 1.243.176 SD1"
{ I ) Hold 217.695 SI ol he Cr high carbon against shortfall of 544.238 SDT of specification grade ore.
(2) Hold 243.892 ST ol Fe Cr low carbon against 609.730 SDT of specification grade ore.
(3) Hold 89.208 SDT ol non-specification grade metallurgical ore against the balance of the 89.208 SDT specification grade ore
shortfall.
(4) Hold 47.466 SDT ol non-specillcation grade metallurgical ore against a shortfall of 31.644 ST of he Cr Si.
1 5) Hold 56.830 SDT ol non-specification grade metallurgical ore against a shorttall ol 16,237 ST ot chromium metal
(6) Hold 337.715 SDT ol non-specilication grade metallurgical ore against 337.715 SDT of chemical grade ore shorttall.
c. Columbium (.roup:
(1) Hold930,9ll pounds Cb as Fe Cb against 1.095.189 pounds Cb as concentrates.
(2) Hold 44,851 lb Cb as Cb metal against 52.766 lb Cb as concentrates.
d. Manganese, Dioxide. Battery Grade Group:
Hold 21.989 SD1 ot managanese. battery grade, natural ore against a shortfall ot 21.989 SDT of manganese, battery grade,
synthetic dioxide.
e. Manganese Group, Chemical and Metallurgical Grades: metallurgical grade ore goal is 2.700.000 SDT; inventory 2.409.377 SDT;
shorttall 290.623 SDT of stockpile grade ore.
(1) Hold 14.172 ST ol Mn metal against 35.430 SDT of metallurgical ore.
(2) Hold 23.574 ST of Fe Mn Si against 42.433 SDI ot metallurgical ore.
(3) Hold 28.921 ST ol he Mn medium carbon against 57.842 SDT of metallurgical ore.
(4) Hold 77,461} ST of Fe Mn high carbon against 154.920 SDT of metallurgical ore.
(5) Hold remaining 83,518 ST of Fe Mn high carbon against reduction of ore value in desired inventory mix.
I Opium: Hold 31.795 AM A lb of opium gum against 31.795 AM A lb of opium salt goal.
g Tantalum Group:
(1) Hold 201.133 lb Fa as Ta metal against 237.337 lb Ta as concentrates.
(2) Hold 28.688 lb Ta as Ta C against 33.852 lb la as concentrates.
h Tungsten Group:
(II WC powder goal is 2.000.000 lb W; stockpile grade inventory 1.92 1. 167 lb W; shorttall 78.833 lb W Hold 111,775 lb W as non-
specilication grade WC to offset 78.243 lb W as WC specilication grade (assume 70r i recovery of usable W )
(2) W metal powder goal is 1.600.000 lb W; inventory stockpile grade 1.566,964 lb W; shortfall 33.036 lb W Non-stockpile grade W
metal powder inventory is 331,947 lb W Assume 70'V recovery as usable material, then 331,947 x .70=232,363 lb W. Hold 47. 194 lb W
as non-specification grade powder to offset shortfall of 33.036 stockpile grade W powder
(3) Hold balance of non-stockpile grade W powder 232.363-33.036= 199,327 lb W as powder against 234.209 lbs W as concentrate.
(4) Hold 840,752 lbs W as Fe W stockpile grade against 987,884 lb W as concentrate. Hold 1 .184.609 lb W nonstockpile grade Fe W

















- Pounds of Contained Columbium
- Pounds of Contained Cobalt
- Pounds of Contained Molybdenum
- Pounds of Contained Tantalum
- Pounds of Contained Tungsten
LCT - Long Calcined Ton
LDT - Long Dry Ton
LT - Long Ton
PC - Piece
SDT - Short Drv Ion
ST - Short Ton
ST Ni+Co - Short Tons of Contained Nickel plus Cobalt
ST V - Short Tons of Contained Vanadium




CALCULATION PROCEDURE FOR FAMILY
GROUPINGS OF MATERIALS L9:27-30J
The following example is designed to help the reader
perform and understand the conversions and calculations
used in preparing summary lines for basic family groupings.
The purpose in using basic units for each of the families
or groups of materials is to place the content of the primary
material into a common denominator for easier comparison.
In time of emergency, there would be a need for a mix
of various forms of each metal element. The stockpile goal
for a metal is a mix of products at various stages of up-
grading. The goal is caluclated by examining expected war-
time requirements, availability, and domestic capacity to
produce each of the upgraded forms.
There is a different factor for converting each of the
forms into a common denominator, usually the basic metal
equivalent. The conversion factors are different because
process conversion losses vary. The calculations and con-
versions used for beryllium metal group are shown as an
example. The figures used do not reflect the current in-
ventory quantities.
The beryllium metal group has a surplus of beryl ore (ll%BeO)
and shortaflls of Beryllium copper master alloy (BCMA) and
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beryllium metal. Beryl ore is a raw material used in pro-
ducing the other two products. The surplus of beryl ore is
used to offset the shortfall of the upgraded forms, but in
different proportions for each product because of the pro-
duct composition and the accompanying processing loss.
COMMODITY UNIT






















Note that the available surplus of beryl
ore is 17,986 ST.
2. Calculate the shortfall of BCMA.
16,710 ST Goal minus 7,387 ST inven-
tory equals 9,323 ST shortfall.
3. Calculate the quantity of beryl ore re-
quired to offset 9,323 ST of BCMA.
9,3 23 ST BCMA times 1.3 equals
12,120 ST beryl ore.
4. Calculate the basic unit equivalent of
the 9,323 ST of BCMA.
9,323 ST BCMA times 0.04 equals 373
ST beryllium metal.
5. Subtract the quantity of ore calculated
to offset the shortfall of BCMA (3 above)
from the total quantity of ore available (1
above).
17,986 ST ore minus 12,120 ST ore
equals 5,866 ST of ore remaining.
6. The remaining quantity of surplus ore
not used to cover the BCMA shortfall can
now be used to offset part of the shortfall of
beryllium metal. Convert the remaining ore to
beryllium metal.
5,866 ST ore times 0.02801 equals 164
ST beryllium metal.
7. The total surplus beryl ore has been
converted to the two upgraded forms, BCMA
and beryllium metal, to cover the shortfall of
these forms. The balance of excess ore is now
zero.
12,120 ST ore converted to 9,323 ST
BCMA
5,866 ST ore converted to 164 ST be-
ryllium metal
Total 17,986 ST ore converted to
BCMA and beryllium metal.
In converting the ore to beryllium met-
al, only one conversion was required. To
convert the BCMA to the basic unit, i.e., be-
ryllium metal, an additional conversion is
needed. BCMA contains a nominal 4 percent
beryllium metal. To convert the BCMA to
beryllium metal, simply multiply 9,323
BCMA ST by .04 which equals 373 ST of
beryllium metal.
The conversion to basic units is now
complete.
12,120 ST ore to BCMA to beryllium
metal equals 373 ST.
5,866 ST ore to beryllium metal equals
164 ST.









Excess to Goal 17.986
Converted to Offset BCMA Shortfall
(9.323 X 1.3) -12,120 373
Balance 5.866
Converted to Offset Beryllium Metal
Shortfall (5.866X0.02801) -5,866 164
Balance of Excess
Total of Basic Units Offset 537
The balance of the family totals is shown in
the table. Each oi the forms of beryllium
material has been converted to the basic be-
ryllium metal units for easy subtraction and
addition. Surplus material is shown as posi-
tive, shortfalls are shown as negative. The fi-
nal balance for the family is 1,061 ST in
inventory. 1 .563 ST needed for the goal, leav-
ing a shortfall of 502 ST beryllium metal.
Balance of Family Totals in Basic Units
Inventory Goal
Excess ( + )
Deficit (-)











Total 1,06) 1,563 -502
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Factors Used for Converting Materials Into Family Groups
Materials I nil
Multiple
Factor Basic l-amilv I nit
Alumina SI
Aluminum Oxide Fused. Crude SI
Bauxite. Abrasive Crude 1 I.C7
Bauxite. Metal Crude. Jamaica 1 v pe SI
Bauxite. Metal Crude. Surinam Ivpe .... ST
Beryl Ore (I I', BeO) SI
Beryllium Copper Master Allov (4', Bel . . SI
Chromile, Chemical Crade Ore SI
Chromite. Metallurgical Crude Ore ST
Chromium, Eerro. High Carbon ST
Chromium. Eerso. Low Carbon ST
Chromium, Eerro. Silicon ST
Columbium. Concentrates IB
Diamond Dies. Small PC
Manganese. Dioxide. Batterv Crade.... SDT
Manganese. Chemical Crade SI
Manganese. Metallurgical Crade ST
Manganese. Kerro. High Carbon ST
Manganese. Eerro. Medium Carbon Sf
Manganese. Ferro. Silicon ST
Opium Cum AM A l.B
I antalum Minerals l.B





































































'New conversion luctor lurnished bv Bureau ol Vlmes. Department ol the Interior
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